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ABSTRACT
CREATING A CULTURE OF POLITICAL GIVING
SEPTEMBER 2006
DAVID L. WILTSE
,
B.A., MONTANA STATE UNIVERSITY
M . A
. ,
CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY FULLERTON
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Raymond La Raja
Financial contributions by individuals to political
candidates and parties are a critically important, yet
largely overlooked mode of political participation. To
date, no one has examined the effects of campaign finance
laws on the likelihood of individual contributions. This
work does just that, and finds that campaign finance
regimes have an indirect effect on the likelihood of an
individual contribution by an indirect route. Campaign
finance laws shape the behavior of the political elite, who
in turn rouse citizens into this critical form of political
participation.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Professor Sorauf's Question
The competition for money in politics is an almost
uniquely American phenomenon. Candidates are essentially
political entrepreneurs fighting not only for electoral
victory, but for political contributions as well. For most
political races it is incumbent upon the candidates to
provide nearly all of their own funding. Consequentially,
greater and greater amounts of political candidates' time
goes into fundraising activities. As the cost of
campaigning has risen, the ability of candidates to raise
money has become one of their greatest assets. In fact,
the viability of a candidate is often determined by his or
her skills in creating a sound fundraising organization.
With this, comes a growing reliance on individual
contributors, who voluntarily offer portions of their
discretionary income. And since the rise of campaign
finance laws in the 1970 's, individual contribution is a
mode of political participation of growing importance.
Over the past few decades, as our nation has moved
from a virtually unregulated system of campaign finance to
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one of the tightest regulatory regimes in the world,
academics and pundits alike have been focusing more
attention to the role money plays in our political system.
Volumes have been written on whether money buys votes
(Frendreis and Waterman, 1985; Grenzke, 1989; Kau, Keenan
and Rubin, 1982; Saltzman, 1987; Wawrow, 2001; Welch, 1982;
and Wright, 1985), the role of political action committees
(PACs) in the policy process (Biersack, Hernnson, and
Wilcox, 1994; Clawson, Neustadtl, and Scott, 1992; Evans,
1988; Gopoian, 1984; Hall and Wayman, 1990; Poole and
Romer, 1985; Stratmann, 1992; and Wilcox, 1989), the
relationship between campaign spending and electoral
success (Gerber, 1998; Geirzynski and Breaux, 1991; Green
and Krasno, 1988; and Jacobson, 1978, 1990), and more
recently, the phenomenon of self-financed candidates
(Steen, 2006; and Wilcox, 1988). As interesting as these
questions are to researchers, the central focus of this
inquiry is how campaign contribution is a vital mode of
political participation and whether campaign finance laws
encourage or discourage this brand of participation.
In the contemporary American political era, the
individual contributor is the financial rock on which
campaigning is founded. Despite the attention paid to PACs
and other large interest groups, the lion's share of money
2
in American politics, be it to candidates or parties, is
contributed by individuals. For example: In the primary
phase of the 2004 election (prior to the candidates being
prohibited in most fundraising by the public financing
rules in the general election phase), the campaigns of
President Bush and Senator Kerry, according to FEC
disclosures, had an approximate total of $505 million in
receipts, about $474 million of which was from individual
donors. On the Congressional side, where PAC activity is
under the most scrutiny, PAC contributions comprise a
larger share of total contributions, yet the individual
contributor still provides the majority of campaign
funding.
Aside from the substantial or even dominant role that
the individual contributor has in strict financial terms,
there is a deeper and normatively important part that the
individual plays in our pluralistic system. Though there
is a vigorous political debate as to just how
representative our campaign finance system is, it is far
more broadly based than any other democratic system in the
world. This prompted Sorauf (1988) to posit:
Above all, the American way of campaign finance is
voluntary and broadly based. To an extent unknown
elsewhere in the world, it depends upon the decisions
of millions of citizens to channel some of their
disposable resources into electoral combat (44).
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Not only is the system broadly based, it is broadly based
on the individuals voluntarily choosing to participate in
this particular fashion. Taxpayers even have a choice to
participate in the public financing programs at the federal
and state levels through some form of checkoff on their tax
returns; thus making even our public finance systems almost
entirely voluntary. Though it is certainly an elite
activity, political contributing is a vital mode of
participation
.
In the years since Sorauf's work, several authors have
recognized the importance of political contributing as a
mode of political participation. Rosenstone and Hansen
(1993) found it to be the most common form of political
participation outside of voting and attempting to influence
another person's vote. And they viewed it as a vital
enough mode of participation to include throughout their
inquiry into political participation. Verba, Schlozman,
and Brady also put campaign contributions in a class of
critical modes of participation. In their highly
influential 1995 work they say this of "checkbook"
participation
:
[W]hen we consider changes in the amount of political
activity over the last two decades, one mode of
participation that seems to have increased is making a
campaign contribution. Rapidly rising campaign costs,
the enhanced role of paid professionals — rather than
amateur volunteers — in managing campaigns, and the
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development of sophisticated telephone and mass mail
techniques of raising money have conspired to augment
the role of the citizen as the writer of checks. (67)
Between the changing technologies and modes of
electioneering and the growing limitations being placed on
campaign fundraising, explicitly put in place to
marginalize the fabled "fat cat" contributor, we are left
in a position where the importance of the individual
contributor is constantly growing. Yet, as Sorauf (1988)
aptly asked, "How is it that we have been satisfied knowing
so little about so common a political activity?" He
continued, "Moreover, the neglect is all the more
regrettable if one agrees that the broad-based volunteerism
of those millions give the American system of campaign
finance its most distinguishing quality." (70)
In many respects, despite the work of the previously
mentioned authors, Sorauf ' s question and concerns are still
valid. Though both works answer several questions about
campaign contributions as participation, they have left
other large questions unanswered. Previous works on
political participation were largely based on descriptive
qualities of individuals: socioeconomic status, race,
gender, and the like. They largely left people in
theoretical isolation, and assumed that some people are
more likely to participate than others based on their
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backgrounds and identities. Rosenstone and Hansen placed
people in a political context and showed how mobilization
by political elites drove participation. Verba, Schlozman,
and Brady placed those individuals in our traditional
institutions of civil society and showed how those prepared
and propelled people for political life and engagement. I
bring an additional dimension to the determinants of
checkbook participation, the way in which campaign finance
laws indirectly bring greater participation rates.
The Indirect Effects of State Campaign Finance Laws on
Contribution Behavior
My hypothesis is quite simple; the primary effects
that campaign finance regimes have on an individual's
decision to contribute or not, is by an indirect route.
State laws are examined herein because of their wide
variation throughout the time series examined. These state
laws place various incentives and disincentives on parties
and candidates. This yields widely varying incentive
structures on these actors and shapes their behavior
accordingly. This theory builds largely on the work of
Rosenstone and Hansen who worked under the assumption that
individuals rarely participate spontaneously; they must be
mobilized. As shown more recently by Grant and Rudolph
(2002), who looked at contribution determinants alone,
6
mobilization in the form of solicitations is a key
determinant of an individual making a contribution. I
contend that the solicitation behaviors of candidates and
parties are affected by the campaign finance regime under
which they operate. Not because laws influence
contributors directly, but because laws shape the behaviors
of those who are prompting citizens to participate. The
two specific laws that should have an effect on parties and
candidates solicitation behaviors are individual
contribution limits and public financing.
In states with low individual contribution limits, the
political elite, either parties or candidates, should be
harder pressed for resources than in states with high or no
limits. The reason for this is simple, in states with high
or unlimited individual contributions, candidates and
parties can rely on fewer, higher dollar contributions.
They simply will not have to expend as much effort to raise
the same amount of cash in a state with low individual
limits. As such, the solicitation rates in high limit
states will be lower than in the tightly limited states.
Consequently, and indirectly, the likelihood of a
contribution should be lower in that state. The same
dynamic should apply to party limits as well.
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The incentives and disincentives created by public
financing should be of indirect route as well. However,
there should be a direct opposite effect between the two
types of public subsidies. In states that directly finance
candidates we should see an increase in solicitations (and
thereby an increase in contribution rates), simply because
of the qualification requirements for multiple low dollar
contributions force the candidates to solicit hard. In
states that have direct party aid, the incentives created
by the law should decrease the likelihood of an individual
contribution simply because the state parties may likely
ramp down their solicitation operations since they will not
be as hard pressed for cash.
Simply put, campaign finance laws matter in an
individual's calculus to make a political contribution.
However, they have an indirect effect on that decision that
works through the actions of the political elite.
The Layout of the Dissertation
No academic study is, nor should be, a theoretical
island unto itself. Chapter 2 will squarely base this work
on the foundational works on political participation. In
their earliest incarnations, the participation literature
focused almost entirely on voting and used the descriptive
characteristics of citizens in explaining the likelihood of
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participation. In the decades since, not only has the
literature expanded into other modes of political
participation, but also the explanations have moved "beyond
SES." Among other factors, they folded in the effects of
party mobilization, social connectedness, civic engagement,
and even geographic spatial relationships in predicting
participation. Chapter 2 will also detail the underlying
theory of the indirect effects of campaign finance laws on
individuals making a political contribution.
Chapter 3 will provide a survey of state campaign
finance regimes. As we live in a federal system, the
variation in state laws is quite extreme. Some states are
nearly free of campaign finance restrictions, others are
quite tightly regulated, and many fall happily in between.
That wide variation is critical in the quantitative testing
to come. In addition to the limitations on individual
contribution we need to describe the variations in public
financing systems. As we shall see, states generally have
one of two types: those that subsidize parties, and those
that subsidize candidates. Both had distinct
justifications and intended effects when enacted. Chapter
3 will also provide a quick overview of the politics of
campaign finance reform to see what the intentions of
reformers were, and the objections raised by standpatters.
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The quantitative testing of the hypotheses laid forth
in Chapter 2 will be conducted in Chapter 4, using the
descriptions of the campaign finance laws from the previous
chapter as the central explanatory variables. The modeling
will be conducted with logistic regression to gauge the
likelihood of solicitation, candidate contribution, and
party contribution. The multiple models will allow us to
see whether or not campaign finance laws affect elite
behavior; and then gauge whether that elite behavior
indirectly sparks contribution behavior.
Chapter 5 will then sum up the principle findings of
this work, address some of the policy ramifications of
those findings, and make suggestions for future research.
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CHAPTER 2
THE TRADITIONAL EXPLANATIONS OF PARTICIPATION
AND
THE INDIRECT EFFECTS OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REGIMES ON THE INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTION DECISION
Introduction
Having established in the introductory chapter that
the role of the individual contributor is both a critical
component of our campaign finance system and an important
mode of political participation, we must now place this in
the broader context of the existing literature on political
participation and develop a theoretical framework to begin
to fully explore the relationship between campaign finance
laws and the likelihood of an individual making a political
contribution. The overall trajectory of those who have
studied contribution behavior has been to use the existing
participation literature as a theoretical springboard into
their own work. Since studying the relationship between
campaign finance regimes and contribution likelihood is a
relatively novel approach in the study of contribution
behavior, we must follow this same trajectory. We must
firmly base this study in the existing literature on other
11
modes of participation, examine those existing models of
contribution behavior, and apply those lessons learned to
the central thesis here.
Simply put, the central thesis of this work is that
state campaign finance rules matter in predicting the
likelihood of an individual contribution. In addition to
the descriptive factors that drive the contribution
decision that will be discussed shortly, there is an
indirect causal relationship between campaign finance
regimes and contribution behavior. Certain types of
campaign finance laws such as low contribution limits and
public financing of candidates place incentives upon
political elites to broaden their financial bases as much
as possible. Those elites, be they candidates or parties,
react logically to the incentive structures placed upon
them and ramp up their solicitation activities accordingly;
which as we shall see quite clearly have direct payoffs in
the numbers of contributors brought into the fold.
Individuals that live in states with low individual
contribution limits and with public financing of candidates
should be more inclined to contribute because of this
indirect relationship. Citizens in states with direct aid
to parties and high individual contribution limits should
be less inclined to contribute since direct party support
12
may relieve parties of the impulse to aggressively solicit
contributions from as broad of a base as possible. Those
living in states where parties are privately financed have
a greater likelihood of being solicited, and thus more
likely to contribute.
Traditional Explanations of Political Participation
Socioeconomic Status
Empirical research on the determinants of political
participation has a rich history that dates back to the
1970's and early 1980 's. As voting rates began to trend
sharply downwards throughout the 20 tr' century, and more
recently from the peak in the early 1960 's, scholars went
to work exploring possible explanations. This early work
quickly settled on a variety of explanations centering
around the positive relationship between socioeconomic
status (SES (income, education, and occupation)) and
likelihood of voting. Reiter (1979) found that income and
educational levels were the most important factors that he
tested. He noted that, "the decline in turnout since 1960
has not been occurring among all social groups equally;
poor and less educated whites have been dropping out of the
electorate at greater rates than wealthy and highly
educated whites [emphasis his] (304). Additionally, he
challenged some of the commonly held assumptions that the
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expansion of the suffrage to minorities accounted for much
of the decline in turnout rates. The sharpest declines in
turnout rates actually occurred among whites of lower SES,
not blacks, as the simple descriptive statistics of voting
participation suggest (309).
Shortly after Reiter's work, a flurry of studies were
spurred examining the determinants of voting participation
based primarily on SES factors. Throughout the 1980 's, and
into the 1990 's, SES factors remained an integral, if not
always the most critical factor in determining the
likelihood of citizens participating in the political
system in its most fundamental mode. Scholar after scholar
took note of the persistence of class bias (most often
measured by income) in likelihood of voting (Burnham, 1982,
1987; Cavanaugh, 1981; Rosenstone and Hanson, 1993;
Teixeira, 1987, 1992; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995;
Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980). Some such as Almond and
Verba (1963) and Sobel (1993) have shown a positive
relationship between workplace status and decision making
to higher rates of political participation.
Of special relevance to this study, some began to
apply these base assumptions of an SES bias to other modes
of participation such as: working for political parties or
campaigns, signing and passing petitions, attempting to
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persuade friends politically, protesting, and making a
financial contribution (Cho, 2003; Rosenstone and Hanson,
1993; Theiss-Morse , 1993; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady,
1995). This SES bias that the Reiter and the other early
studies found has remained remarkably stable since the
1960's, despite the fact that general participation rates
have dropped across all economic classes (Leighley and
Nagler, 1992; Shields and Goidel, 1997).
The persistence of this class bias also has some
serious normative concerns as well. Several scholars have
explored whether or not there have been any substantive
policy biases as a result of the skewed participation
rates. Particular attention has been paid to states'
redistributive social welfare programs, since the linkage
between overall state welfare spending and class bias in
voting makes good intuitive sense. Though there is some
disagreement on the exact mechanisms behind the trend, it
is firmly established that higher levels of political
participation lead to increased redistribution in social
spending (Hill and Leighley, 1992; Hill, Leighley, Hinton-
Anderson, 1995; Jennings, 1979; Peterson and Rom, 1989).
In each of these works the authors posit that greater class
disparity of electoral participation is clearly linked to a
significant inequity in public policy.
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It is this very same perceived inequity in
contribution behavior that has been a great part of the
impetus for significant campaign finance reforms brought
forward since the 1970's. The stated intent of many
reformers has been to achieve more equitable public policy
across the entire policy spectrum. Though in some of the
more vulgar manifestations of this reform impulse there is
the nebulous and somewhat silly call to, "Take big money
out of politics;" there are several more nuanced critiques
offered by reformers and political scientists alike.
Though this normative dimension will be further explored in
Chapter 3, suffice it to say for now that the perceived
bias in contribution behavior is of serious normative
concern for both political activists and scholars
advocating wholesale reforms of our political finance
system (see Goidel, Gross, and Shields, 1999).
Given the central role that SES has been used to
explain electoral participation it should come as no
surprise that those scholars who have made the first
attempts at modeling contribution behavior have uniformly
included SES variables in their models. Too, the models
they have employed with SES as independent variables have
yielded remarkably consistent findings on the magnitude and
significance of SES factors on the likelihood of an
16
individual making a contribution. Though SES was not the
central focus of their work, Rosenstone and Hanson's (1993)
models of participation found strong positive relationships
between income and education and the likelihood of
contribution. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) found
that income was the primary determinant of contribution,
Shields and Goidel (2000) saw a strong positive
relationship between both income and education, as did
Grant and Rudolph (2002). Clearly the SES of an individual
is a factor that must be taken into account when
determining the likelihood of a political contribution.
Demographics
Because there has been a clear distinction between the
absolute levels of participation between whites and racial
minorities across all modes of participation, race has been
the focus of many queries into political participation.
Several attempts to "net out" the effects of race on
participation, using more sophisticated modeling
techniques, have found that race alone is not a primary
determinant of participation. The vast discrepancies
between the participation rates of minorities were found to
be due to a more complex relationship between SES and race
that was lurking beneath the descriptive statistics. Early
work clearly established that once SES was controlled for
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using regression models, the likelihood of political
participation in several forms for black Americans was
often higher than their white counterparts (Olsen, 1970;
Orum, 1966). As Gutterbock and London explain, "race
enhances participation because race and class conscious
blacks participate to excess as a positive means of
striving for social changes that could benefit the black
community" (440). Simply put, once income and education
are controlled for, minority participation rates will be
higher since the political awareness and saliency of
political issues is greater within minority communities.
Further refinements of the effects that race has had
on participation began to flourish concurrently with the
increasing diversity (and perhaps more importantly the
awareness of scholars to the diversity) of the American
people. As a result of growing Hispanic and Asian
populations in the United States, distinctions between, and
the determinants of the political participation rates of
the different racial groups are beginning to become
apparent. All of these scholars test various theories of
group connectedness that are logical derivatives of Olsen
and Orum. Shaw, de la Garza and Lee (2000), found support
for the theory that ethnic mobilization networks were a
more important factor than traditional forms of
18
mobilization (parties etc.) in accounting for voting
participation amongst Latinos in the 1992 and 1996
elections. Leighly and Vediltz (1999) go several steps
farther and expand their research to other modes of
participation, including political contributions. They
find that social connectedness (as measured by length of
residence in the community) is a significant factor to a
varying degree between white, black, Hispanic, and Asian
Americans. Cho (2003) further refines the modeling of
participation, exclusively to contribution, by examining
the patterns of political donations with specific attention
to geographic clusters (spatial dependence). In exploring
patterns of contribution in the Asian community she finds
support for the "contagion" effect which she attributes to
a spatial relationship beyond any individual
characteristics (including SES). She argues there is,
"some type of diffusion force [that] prominently underlies
the Asia American campaign contribution network" (381).
Age has also been a persistent predictor of political
participation by nearly every scholar referred to thus far.
The positive relationship between age and voting rates is
readily apparent by even the most cursory examination of
the descriptive statistics on participation. Clearly, as
people age, they become more attached to their political
19
institutions and become more engaging as fully
participating citizens. There are a couple of competing
theories as to the exact dynamics of the age differential
in participation. One school of thought offers a
generational explanation. They argue that political
differences between age cohorts have their genesis in the
differences between the political socialization that each
cohort shares when coming of political age. This
generational dynamic has received attention in the
explanation of the variation in the intensity of
partisanship between different cohorts by Beck (1974), Key
(1955), and Sundquist (1973).
Another explanation of tne growing participation rates
that come with age is based not so much on the shared
socialization in the formative years, but focuses on the
experiences and resources gained as individuals age. As
people progress in years, transformations in life begin to
occur (Campbell, 1971; Glenn and Grimes, 1968). They learn
more about political institutions and the political
process. They marry (Stoker and Jennings, 1995), have
children, and thus have more of a stake in the community
and the services their communities provide. They become
less transient (Squire, Wolfinger, and Glass, 1987) and
more embedded in their communities and begin to become
20
involved in civic organizations. Many of these civic
organizations (church, charities, schools, "animal" clubs
(Elks, Moose, etc.)) foster broader participation in the
community by developing "civic competence." This
educational process helps propel individuals into taking a
deeper role in political life (Strate, Parish, Elder, and
Ford, 1989). All told, the cumulative experiences that
build over the years transform people in their early to
middle ages into more active, competent, and engaged
citizens in all dimensions. Regardless of the exact
mechanism, be it generational or life experience, involved
in promoting higher rates of participation, age is a
determinant that must be factored into any calculus of
political participation.
The existence and explanation of the gender gap in
rates of political participation have also been of key
concern for social scientists for several decades as well.
The gender gap persists in most of the modes of
participation, especially in campaign contributions.
However, it is both welcome and well known news that the
gender gap in voting participation has evaporated. In
fact, women now vote at a slightly higher rate than men and
have for several election cycles. As the gender gap in
voting was narrowing, several researchers began to account
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for the trend in this transformation of gender roles.
Anderson (1975) showed that much of this transformation in
women's political participation pre-dated the feminist
movement of the 1960 's and 1970's. She effectively showed
that the growing rates of participation were largely the
result of more women entering the workforce and that the
unity between women's rights activists of the era was just
part (and a fleeting part at best) of the cause for the
gap's disappearance. This lag in time from the 1950's when
women began to enter the workforce, to the 1970 's when the
gender gap really began to narrow in voting, was well
explained by Anderson and Cook (1985). Using panel data,
they showed how time in the workforce was the important
factor in socializing women into political participation,
rather than the simple entrance into the workforce. As
women became more seeped in the working environment they
became better socialized in an environment once dominated
by men, and learned the skills and values necessary to
apply to full political participation.
Others have also explored the positive relationship
between women entering the workforce and higher rates of
political participation that hinge upon adult
socialization. Gurin (1986) and Sapiro (1983) show that
full-time homemakers have a number of obstacles that hinder
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full political participation including: how staying at home
full time reinforces traditional gender roles, lacking the
communication skills needed in an alien and competitive
political environment, and how the isolation of stay-at-
home women can cut them off from the important social and
political networks that facilitate full participation.
Perhaps the best summation of the importance of gender
differences in participation comes from the various
incarnations of the resource model of participation put
forward by Brady, Burns, Nie, Schlozman, and Verba. They
have shown that political resources (money, spare time, and
civic skills) are critical predictors of political
participation in general, and specifically in the act of
making a political contribution. As these skills are
largely developed later in life, it has been shown that
women are disadvantaged by traditional gender roles in
various types of civic engagement. Thus, because of their
treatment at work, church, “animal clubs," charities, and
the like, the “pathways" to political participation leave
women with a significant gap in the resources that
facilitate participation. (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman,
1995; Schlozman, Burns, and Verba, 1994 and 1999; Verba
Schlozman, Brady, and Nie, 1993; and Verba, Schlozman, and
Brady, 1995 )
.
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Solicitation
Citizens rarely participate in politics soley out
their own internal impulses. Rather, citizen participation
is roused by a combination of persuasive forces placed upon
them by interest groups, parties, campaigns, and
politically active friends. In the bygone era of party
preeminence, prior to the Progressive reforms of the early
20 th century, mobilization of the electorate by the parties
was perhaps the most important function of parties in our
democracy. From the perspective of a modern social
scientist who sees the positive relationship between the
various SES factors and of the likelihood of voting, it
seems ironic that a people 100 years ago, who as a whole
had much lower SES status, went to the polls at much higher
rates. For many scholars, there is clearly a sense of
political disengagement that has come with the weakening of
political parties. Perhaps the normative sense of loss on
the parts of many researchers is the impulse that has
driven them to delve into the importance of mobilization
efforts today.
Since the 1960's and the advent of comprehensive cross
sectional and panel surveys of political behavior and
attitudes (such as the National Election Studies),
researchers have been given reams of data to more fully
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understand the effects of party and candidate contact and
the likelihood of political participation. Early work
showed that local party and campaign contact was a key
determinant of voter turnout (Katz and Eldersveld, 1961;
Cutright, 1963). Kramer (1970) showed that door to door
canvassing led to higher rates of participation, though he
discounted the efficacy of repeated contacts and showed
that voters' preferences were not usually affected.
Weilhouer and Lockerbie (1994) affirm the importance of
party contact, both in terms of statistical significance
and substantive impact, on the likelihood of voting.
Rosenstone and Hanson (1993) credit a large portion of the
drop in voter turnout from the 1960's to the 1980 's with a
decline in party mobilization efforts. Kernell and
Jacobson (2000) echo those sentiments and extend the lack
of mobilizing efforts to unions, candidates, and interest
groups as well.
Others have begun to question whether or not the
techniques of modern campaigns have begun to erode the
effectiveness of party and campaign mobilization. Figure
2 . 1 shows that the volume of contact seems to be quite
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stable over the span of the NES dataset with sharp increase
in the last two Presidential election cycles. 1 Even
though it can be argued that the amount of resources
candidates and parties are placing into mobilization, and
that the proportion of citizens contacted has been quite
consistent over the years (and growing in recent years),
several questions loom as to the quality of mobilization in
the modern era. On face value it certainly would seem
plausible that in an era of high power political
consultants, instantly available phone banks, and recorded
messages from candidates begging for citizens political and
financial support, that this new style of mobilization
might be too cold and impersonal to be as effective as the
canvassing done in the "good old days."
1 The drop in 1972 can be explained by a change in the
wording of the question for that year alone by the NES.
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Figure 2.1: Percent of Respondents Solicited by A Major
Political Party
Source: NES
Blydenburgh (1971) began to explore the differences in
types of contact, and found that telephone contact may be
less effective in rousing voters than direct canvassing.
Putnam, in his influential work on the transformation of
American civic life, Bowling Alone, posits that, "The
'contacts' that voters report are, in fact, less likely to
be a visit from a neighborhood party worker and more and
more likely to be an anonymous call from a paid phone bank.
Less and less party activity involves volunteer
collaboration among committed partisans." He continues,
"The bottom line in the political industry is this:
Financial capital- the wherewithal for mass marketing- has
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steadily replaced social capital- that is, grassroots
citizens networks- as the coin of the realm" (39). Others
share this sentiment. Gerber and Green (2000) show that
personal contacts are simply much more effective at
mobilizing the electorate than telephone contact. Schier
(2000) mourns the decay of the party in mobilization being
supplanted by activation strategies by interest groups.
Even though the merit of these critics' arguments has been
questioned (Goldstein and Ridout, 2002), nowhere do they
show that modern mobilization is completely ineffective.
Therefore, the mobilization efforts that are made by
parties are clearly a factor in determining the likelihood
of participation.
In regards to the central thesis of this work, several
researchers have begun to apply this work on mobilization
voting participation to the likelihood of a financial
contribution as well. The mobilization efforts and
contacts made by political parties were a central focus of
Rosenstone and Hansen's (1993) modeling of contributions.
Weilhouer and Lockerbie (1994) also took note of the
positive relationship between party contact and the
likelihood of a contribution saying, "Few people would
spontaneously make a financial contribution: they need to
be asked" (225). Grant and Rudolph (2002) have offered the
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best effort to explicitly link contact, by both parties and
candidates, to making a contribution. They found that
solicitation was a more decisive factor in determining the
likelihood of a contribution than were financial resources
and other SES qualities. Given that fact, mobilization
efforts of the parties must be accounted for in any model
of political participation.
Legal Restraints
As scholars began to concern themselves more and more
with the determinants of the likelihood of voting, it did
not take long before a series of work emerged that explored
the institutional and legal restraints that raise the
costs, and therefore lower the likelihood, of casting a
vote. Comparative perspectives of voting likelihood
suggested that institutional arrangements and legal
restraints played an important role in determining
participation rates. The standout legal restraint in the
United States is our system of voting registration. Since
the two step process of registration and voting
significantly raises the cost of participating, scholars
quickly focused attention to these legal effects on
participation rates. In the years prior to the National
Voting Registration Act of 1993 ( NVRA or "Motor Voter
Act"), there were clear, yet simple, correlations between
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the number of days before an election that a person must
register and participation rates (Minnesota consistently
ranked near the top with election day registration, Georgia
always ranked near the bottom with a 50 day cutoff).
Scholars began to make suggestions on how specific legal
reforms of the registration system would result in an
increase in turnout rates (many of the suggestions made
found their way into the National Voting Registration Act
of 1993).
Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) were among the first
to make the case that easier registration laws would likely
increase the voting population by a factor of 9.1%. In a
broad comparative study, Jackman (1987) found that lower
rates of electoral turnout in the United States were not
due to a difference in our political culture from other
modern industrial democracies that enjoy much higher rates
of participation. Rather, it was institutional structures
and legal factors that suppressed turnout in America.
Countries that had the highest participation rates were
those that had competitive legislative districts,
unicameralism, compulsory voting, and automatic
registration. Mitchell and Wlezlein (1995) examined the
negative effects of purge laws that cleared the voting
rolls after a set period of time (often very short in the
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south) of a voter not casting a vote. Though purge laws
did suppress registration numbers, those affected
negatively were the least likely to vote regardless of
registration status. In the final analysis the effects of
the purges were marginally negative on voting rates.
Timpone (1998) found that there were differential effects
of structure (namely registration laws) across race,
gender, and age groups.
Shortly after the passage of the NVRA, scholars
continued the examination of the effects of registration
laws and began simulating how much the NVRA would raise
participation rates. Highton (1997) found that restrictive
registration laws disproportionately affected those
citizens of low SES. Initially he predicted that there
would marginal increases in actual turnout (though a high
increase in the number registered) as a result of the
lowered registration costs since approximately 90% of the
eligible voting population would be registered under the
provisions of the law. Shortly thereafter in a more
detailed examination of the NVRA's separate provisions, he
and Wolfinger (1998) claimed that there would be between a
4.8 and 7.8 % increase in turnout because of registration
ease, 2% increase due to elimination of the purge laws, and
no increase due to registration by mail.
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The effects of campaign finance laws on interest group
behavior have also begun to be explored. Given the
variation between state campaign finance regimes, different
incentive structures for interest groups will exist between
states. Hogan (2005), utilizing an original cross-sectional
survey, found that in states that have highly restrictive
campaign finance laws (defined by levels of contribution
limits), political action committees and interest groups
place greater efforts in alternative forms of
electioneering. Simply put, restrictions placed on one
behavior essentially force actors to seek out other means
of influence . Hogan's work clearly supports the notion
that institutional arrangements do matter in shaping
electioneering behavior. This same logic should apply to
the behavior of candidates and political parties. Certain
policies and restrictions on one set of behaviors may push
them into different behaviors. The balloon analogy Hogan
uses is useful. When a person squeezes a water balloon, it
bulges out in areas that are not restricted. The result in
the world of electioneering may be a differential impact on
contribution and participation rates across the states.
Though work has begun to emerge that has dealt with
the determinants of contributing explicitly, legal
arrangements have not been fully explored. Rosenstone and
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Hansen's work (1993) was well grounded in a general SES
model, which was expanded to examine the role of
mobilization. They found that financial contributions are
much more likely to be made by the well educated. Verba,
Schlozman, and Brady (1995) applied their political
resource model to the act of political contribution. The
model had a relatively tough time predicting the likelihood
of a financial contribution being made. None of their
variables to measure political resources that people
develop through civic engagement (civic skills, religious
attendance, political information) were statistically
significant. Apparently making a contribution relies upon
family income and "little else" (444, 446). Though their
general resource model moved well beyond SES, those SES
factors appeared to remain dominant in contribution
behavior. Grant and Rudolph (2002) have also "thickened"
the modeling of individuals' contribution decision beyond
SES. In their analysis they bring solicitation by
candidates and parties into the fold and demonstrate its
preeminence as a determinant of a contribution.
This leaves us in a position where the work modeling
contribution behavior has focused almost entirely on the
SES and other descriptive qualities of respondents and
their likelihood to contribute. Just as the research on
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other modes of participation (i.e. voting and interest
group electioneering) are beginning to grow out from the
basic SES and descriptive factors, so too should the
research on political contributors. In this light. Shields
and Goidel (2000) examined the effect of the campaign
finance reforms of the 1970 's and its attempt to diminish
the upper class bias that exists amongst contributors.
Though their analysis showed (rather strongly) that there
was little change in the class bias, it did mark a first
step in analyzing the effects of legal constraints on
contributors' behaviors. To extend the research on the
effects of campaign finance regimes on political
contributions, it is most convenient to broaden the level
of analysis to the states and consider whether or not the
various campaign finance regimes in America have differing
effects on citizens' likelihood of contributing.
Scope and Theory of This Study
Having laid the theoretical springboard from which
this study shall launch, it is necessary to precisely
define the theoretical framework that will underlie the
construction of the forthcoming quantitative modeling. The
existing literature on the several modes of political
participation, and the literature specifically regarding
the modeling of the political contribution decision thus
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far reviewed, lead to a few general conclusions that must
be followed in this study. First, the traditional
explanations of political participation (SES, demographics,
etc.) must be included as controls in any attempt to model
contribution behavior. Second, despite the importance of
individual qualities of potential participants, there are
environmental factors (solicitations, "contagions" (that
Cho described), civic organizations) that may direct,
restrain, or promote individual participation. Thirdly, a
most important environmental factor that may exert
influence on an individual's contribution calculus may be
the legal restraints on political financing that are found
within any given political jurisdiction, be it federal or
state. Clearly, the variations in state campaign financing
regimes warrant a careful examination of the possible
differential effects they may have on individual political
contribution
.
The possible effects of campaign finance laws on
potential contributors can be broadly classified in two
general categories: direct effects and indirect effects.
On first blush, any number of reasonable hypotheses can be
constructed regarding the direct effects of both
contribution limits and public financing. But these can be
readily dismissed upon further elaboration to the logical
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end of their arguments and with a cursory examination of
contribution behavior over the past several election
cycles
.
One hypothesis might go as such: Higher individual
contribution limits, or no limits at all, may lead to a
popular impression that campaign financing is an activity
best left to "fat cat" contributors who can dig into deep
pockets and wield tremendous influence. Simply put, an
average citizen's perceived utility in making a
contribution would be minuscule in proportion to large
dollar contributors, thus making a contribution wholly
irrational. As compelling of an argument as this may seem,
any quantitative verification of this dynamic would be
extremely difficult to show using existing data on
political attitudes and behavior such as the NES or Current
Population Survey, since they simply do not ask the
necessary questions. However, a cursory examination of
contribution rates and the increases in small donations and
contribution rates in recent election cycles indicate that
the behaviors of an increasing number of Americans are
simply incompatible with such a hypothesis.
Another hypothesis regarding the direct effects of
campaign limits could be constructed in the direct opposite
direction. But it too is fraught with complications. One
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might suggest: In systems with low contribution limits,
citizens may feel constrained, and that the utility of
their own contributions would be lost in a sea of small
contributors. Therefore they would logically choose other
avenues of participation to exert their influence on policy
makers. Recall Hogan's balloon analogy, as one path of
political persuasion is curbed the money would bulge out
into different areas of persuasion. However this
hypothesis would be highly improbable in any situation
outside of that relatively small minority of contributors
that "max out" under contribution limits. Too, those high
level contributors would likely "max out" on individual
contributions, and then move on to another avenue of
electioneering to exert their influence.
Hypothesizing on the direct effects of public
financing regimes is just as problematic. It could be
rationally argued, and often is by reformers, that a sense
of equity amongst potential contributors would encourage
broader participation. Since "fat cat" dominance of the
money game would be mitigated by a partial support of
campaigns by the state, the voices of "regular" citizens
would have a better chance of being heard. One could also
plausibly argue that if a state were to erect a public
financing program, citizens would feel less of a need to
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contribute since the state is picking up part the bill.
This feeling amongst potential contributors would exist to
varying degrees even if the state's substantive
contribution to overall campaign spending is small. So
long as people's perceptions are that the state is funding
campaigns to some degree, they may feel less inclined to
make a contribution. As to the former hypothesis, the
causal connection is often confused by a common requirement
of several public financing regimes: to qualify, candidates
must secure a requisite number of relatively small sized
contributions. As to the latter, we shall see in Chapter 4
that the data simply do not support this claim; citizens
are more likely to contribute in states with public
financing of state elections. In both of these hypotheses
contribution behavior is not because of direct effects of
campaign finance regimes on an individual's calculus to
contribute. Rather it is by an indirect causal link
involving a second actor.
It is my contention that the primary effects that
campaign finance laws have on an individual's contribution
calculus is by an indirect route. Various incentives and
disincentives are placed upon both parties and candidates
by the campaign finance regime of each individual state.
These incentive structures will then shape the behaviors of
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both candidates and parties in their fundraising
strategies. These indirect effects all hinge upon
variations in the compulsion of parties and candidates to
actively solicit funds from state to state. This is an
elite driven process ; that is the political elite, be it
candidates or parties, alter their mobilization and
solicitation behavior as a result of incentives placed upon
them by state campaign finance regimes. This will then
indirectly affect the likelihood of an individual making a
political contribution since the link between solicitation
and contribution is well established.
In finance regimes that have low individual
contribution limits to candidates, candidates will be
forced to solicit greater numbers of contributors in order
to meet their fundraising goals. Solicitation, as we have
seen (Grant and Rudolph, 2002), is one of the best
determinants of an individual contribution. In a state
such as Florida, that has a contribution limit in a
gubernatorial contest of $500, a candidate could
conceivably have to secure 40 maximum contributions to
match a single "maxed out" contribution of $20,000 in the
same race in California. Thus, a negative relationship
between the contribution limit (if one exists) and the
likelihood of an individual contribution should be seen in
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any given state. Simply put, lower contribution limits
should lead to more contributions. This same dynamic
should extend to party contribution limits as well: Tighter
contribution limits will compel parties to ratchet up their
fundraising operations, seeking out a higher number of
small contributions, and in turn drive up contribution
rates within their states.
The incentives created by public finance systems
should also show this same indirect connection between
finance laws and contribution behaviors of individuals.
Public finance systems generally take two distinct (but not
always mutually exclusive) forms. Suffice it to say for
now (the details will be explored in Chapter 3), states
generally have systems that either give direct financing to
parties or give direct aid to candidates. The indirect
causal relationship should push the behavior of political
elites in opposite directions depending upon which system
they are operating under. In states with the former system
giving direct aid to parties, the incentive structures
created by the law should decrease the likelihood of an
individual making a political contribution relative to
individuals in states that do not have direct party aid.
The indirect causation being that states that do not have
direct party aid are creating stronger incentives for
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parties to solicit compared to parties in states with
direct aid. Parties in states with direct party aid may
feel less pressed for cash, hence the impulse for
aggressive solicitation might not be as potent. As a
result, the likelihood of an individual contributing is
less if the likelihood of solicitation is lower.
In states with the latter system of direct candidate
support, there should be a corresponding increase in the
likelihood of an individual contribution. The indirect
causal mechanism works as such: Since most states that have
direct candidate support require a certain number of small
contributions for qualification, those laws (if properly
constructed by reformers and actually funded by
legislatures) should give direct incentives to candidates
to expand solicitation activities to generate numerous
small contributions, thus increasing the likelihood of an
individual contribution. That small handful of states that
have direct aid to both parties and candidates may be in an
interesting position of having cross cutting incentives
indirectly tugging in opposite directions. Careful model
specification should tease out which pressures carry the
most effect.
Since the indirect causal theories that I have
hypothesized herein all center around the incentives
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created by campaign finance regimes, either encouraging or
discouraging candidates and parties to solicit
contributors, an obvious theoretical issue is simultaneity.
Simply put, if simultaneity exists, individuals who have
previously made financial contributions, are more likely to
be solicited to contribute again. In essence, the causal
connection is running both ways. If simultaneity is
present, the mathematical assumptions of multiple
regression and logistic regression would be violated,
rendering unreliable results. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993)
who develop very similar models of participation in which
party contact plays a central part (though obviously void
of the campaign finance law variables I propose), deny the
existence of simultaneity in their model for two all
important reasons.
The real statistical problem, we believe, is not
simultaneity but our unavoidable failure to include an
unobserved variable- the parties' estimates of the
likelihood that each person will participate if asked.
In practice, we think the consequences for the
consistency of our estimates are relatively small. We
have already included in each equation most of the
objective indicators that parties might rely on in
forming their estimates, except one: past involvement.
Given the modest continuity in participation that we
documented in Chapter 3,‘ knowing who took part last
time might not necessarily be a good guide to who
might participate this time (172).
' Using NES panel data from 1956-1960 and 1972-1976 periods
they ascertained that a rather small minority of political
contributors were habitual contributors (53-55).
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This finding of high turnover in the donor pool has also
been shown more recently in a survey conducted by the
Institute for Politics Democracy and the Internet (2006) of
donors in the 2004 election. It concludes that there is
much more "churning" of the donor pool than previously
assumed by professional fundraisers. They show that people
enter and leave the donor pool with great fluidity. Given
that the modeling found in Chapter 4 is nearly identical in
these critical regards to Rosenstone and Hansen's work, I
would argue that their logic would be equally applicable in
arguing a general absence of simultaneity in the course of
this study and research design. Taken together, these two
studies strongly suggest that continuity in the donor pools
is not as strong as some would assume.
The theoretical core of the argument presented here is
quite simple: campaign finance laws matter in the shaping
of peoples' decision to contribute, or not, to a political
party or campaign. These individual decisions are shaped
indirectly by state campaign finance regimes placing direct
incentives upon political parties and candidates which may
encourage them to ramp up solicitations of individuals in
their constituencies. To go about testing this hypothesis
is a relatively straight forward task. In Chapter 3, we
shall closely examine the variations between state campaign
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finance regimes to get a better understanding of exactly
what the incentive structures are for political actors, be
they parties or candidates, in any given state to better
understand the exact context in which those decisions are
made. In Chapter 4, we will take those variations of state
laws and incorporate them into quantitative models to test
for the indirect effects of state campaign finance regimes
mathematically, while controlling for the effects of the
other determinants of political participation. Hopefully a
better understanding of the decision making process of
potential contributors will result and perhaps an
assessment of the effectiveness of campaign finance reforms
can be made as well.
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CHAPTER 3
THE TIMING, SHAPE, AND POLITICS
OF STATE CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
Introduction
Campaign finance regulation is a relatively modern
phenomenon at the state level. Not until 1974 and the
major amendments to the Federal Elections Campaign Act
(FECA), did the vast majority of states even begin to
regulate any aspect of campaign financing. However, in the
post-FECA environment, a flurry of campaign finance
regulations of all kinds began to be adopted across the
states. To answer the central question of this query, we
must now undergo an examination of state campaign finance
laws in order to properly test their indirect effects on
individual contribution behavior. To this end we will
examine the timeline of these reforms, describe the
variations in state laws (paying particular attention to
contribution limitations and public financing), and the
political motivations of the reform movements and their
opponents
.
Timeline of Reform
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Although the discipline of political science is lousy
with grand theorists proclaiming periodic or cyclical
patterns of behavior such as waves of democratization,
electoral realignments, etc., no such parsimonious pattern
underlies the dynamics of state campaign finance law
enactment. Rather, there has been a steady march of
reforms enacted at the state level in regulating all
aspects of campaign financing. Nor has there been an
"ideal type" used as a blueprint in bringing into law a
whole package of reforms in more than a handful of states
at any given moment. The general pattern of reform,
broadly speaking across the states, has been incremental
and steady. Those increments have often been followed with
successful court challenges to the more ambitious reform
packages, forcing states to revert back to earlier regimes
from time to time. The result is that campaign finance
regimes in the states are a mosaic in constant
transformation. Many attributes (such as contribution
limits) are widely shared, some (public financing) are
fairly common yet vary from case to case, while others
(such as "clean elections" laws) are found in very few
states. Despite these similarities there are endless
varieties and combinations of finance laws that make
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general assumptions or broad classifications too imprecise
to withstand any methodological rigor.
Though there are no clear "waves" of reform, where
states upon states simultaneously enact similar campaign
finance legislation, there do exist common trajectories in
the enactment of the reforms that will have the most
substantial impact upon individuals' contribution
behaviors. Additionally there is a definite beginning to
these reforms dating to the enactment of the FECA
amendments of 1974. By necessity then, a brief synopsis of
the pre-FECA world of federal campaign finance law is in
order to show the demonstration effect that federal
campaign finance legislation had on legislation in the
states
.
A Brief History of Federal Reform
The Pre-Reform Era of Campaign Finance
Until the early 1970 's there was little in the way of
effective campaign finance regulation in American
elections. As Frank Sorauf (1988) explains, "Before the
new era [post reform] in American campaign finance, there
was no single old era. Neither campaigns nor their funding
in 1950 or 1960 bore much resemblance to campaigns and
campaign finance a hundred years earlier" ( 16 ) . The first
"modern" Presidential campaign was that of Andrew Jackson.
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Prior to that election, aspiring Presidential candidates
did not conduct open campaigns, they would lobby political
elites around the country, hoping their aspirations would
be recognized by the eventual electors of the electoral
college. Jackson broke new ground in his successful bid
for the Presidency in 1828 by making appeals directly to
popular opinion, but he did not directly campaign across
the country himself. Rather, he relied upon his surrogates
in the budding Democratic Party and partisans in the
newspapers to carry his message. Presidential candidates
were often content to stay at home throughout the entire
campaign and let the people, or the press, come to them.
This is not to suggest that campaigns were in any way bland
or uncontested. Far from it. Elections in the "golden
era" of the parties from the mid to late nineteenth century
were highly contentious and the average voter was deeply
involved in the party and electoral process.
1896 marked a great transition in Presidential
campaigning. William McKinley literally ran for office
from his front porch as William Jennings Bryan gave his
fiery oratory across the nation. Though McKinley won by a
comfortable margin, the old era of surrogate campaigning
had come to a close. Thanks largely to new technologies in
both transportation and communications, candidates could no
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longer employ the "front porch" campaign. Citizens began
to expect a more personalized campaign, where candidates
would come to them to woo their votes. The new campaigning
style required more organization, travel, and money.
Even before this transformation of the political
campaign took hold, the Congress began to take up concern
with the appearance of corruption through campaign
financing. The earliest reforms took place shortly after
the tragic death of President Garfield. In the wake of his
assassination, the Pendleton Civil Service Act of 1883
outlawed the forced contribution of funds from political
appointees and employees. However, the dawn of the
Progressive era at the turn of the century brought forth
the first true attempts at creating a more comprehensive
campaign finance regulatory regime.
Transparency and accountability were consistent themes
of Progressive thought regardless of the area of
legislation; campaign finance was no exception. 1907 saw
the banning of donations by corporations and banks by the
Tillman Act. In 1910 (and amendments in 1911) Congress
placed limits on expenditures for House and Senate
elections in the Federal Corrupt Practices Act (these
however were eventually struck down in a series of Supreme
Court decisions). Revisions to the Federal Corrupt
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Practices Act of 1925 brought the most ambitious package of
campaign finance regulation to date. Many of the previous
reforms, spending limits in particular, were fine tuned and
folded into the new law. Reporting of finances were also
required by the political parties. There were also
attempts in the Franklin Roosevelt administration to reign
in some of the "corrupt" activities of parties. The Hatch
Act in 1939 nailed the coffin shut on the patronage system
by prohibiting any federal employees from participating in
any partisan activities. Subsequent amendments in 1940
brought the first contribution limit of $5000 to any
federal candidate and a ban on union contributions."
The shared trait of this collection of reforms though
was ineffectiveness. Enforcement was the greatest problem.
No new controlling authority was created to enforce the new
laws. All reports were submitted to Clerk of the House [of
Representatives], who had no staff or authority to
prosecute violators. As a contemporary observer, political
scientist Louise Overacker noted in 1930, "Some [of these
laws] are so obviously sketchy on the enforcement side as
to arouse the suspicion that the drafters must have hoped
and expected that they would remain dead letter upon the
This was a rather modest attempt at a contribution limit
as this figure equates to approximately $70,000 in 2006
when adjusted for inflation.
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statute books"(295). In fact, 1967 was the first instance
when a Clerk of the House of Representatives, W. Pat
Jennings, performed his duty, under the Corrupt Practices
Act. He collected campaign finance reports and reported
violators to the Department of Justice. His reports,
however, were ignored. There were also massive loopholes
that could easily be exploited. Nearly unlimited funds
could be raised in periods outside of the election season.
This would allow incumbents, parties, and potential
candidates to load up on money prior to their technical
entry into the campaign. With the massive abuses that were
brought to public attention in the Watergate investigation
after the re-election of Richard Nixon in 1972, 4 Americans,
and more importantly Congress, were renewing their demands
for effective reforms.
The Modern Reform Era
Even before the abuses that were occurring in the 1972
election were apparent, Congress had taken some baby steps
in the direction of reform. The 1971 Federal Election
’ Because of these loopholes, Nixon and his associates were
able to bring in several massive contributions from
individuals like Robert Vesco (a notorious corporate
swindler who fled the US in 1973. He is currently an
honored guest of Fidel Castro in a Cuban prison for
cheating that government and international investors on the
production of a promising AIDS drug), Howard Hughes, and
Clement Stone (who gave over $2,000,000). There were
stories of people literally handing CREEP suitcases and
shopping bags full of cash.
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Campaign Act (FECA) passed the Democratic controlled
Congress following the veto of a similar bill the year
before by Republican President Nixon. As Jeffrey Birnbaum
explains, this was "mostly a reaction to the ever-rising
costs of campaigning" (32). Though this was not
necessarily an attempt at a comprehensive regulatory system
of campaign finance, it did mark a beginning step for the
more comprehensive reforms to come later. The major
provisions included: more timely and complete disclosure of
contributions and expenditures, limits on campaign
expenditures, and a limit on contributions from wealthy
candidates to their own campaigns. Though these reforms
were fairly comprehensive relative to the mostly
unregulated era prior to the FECA, they were, in fact,
rather self-serving to the Democrats as Sorauf (1992, p7
)
suggests, since the Democrats were unable to keep pace with
Republicans in the modern, high cost campaigns of the
television era. Just as technology transformed campaigning
into more expensive modes at the turn of the century, the
full-scale embrace of television campaigning during the
1960
'
s
served the same function.
After the Watergate abuses became widely known.
Congress quickly enacted a set of amendments to the FECA.
The 1974 FECA amendments represented a quantum leap in the
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American campaign finance regime. The most familiar
reforms of this package were the dramatic limits that were
placed on individual contributions. A person could donate
no more than $1,000 per election to a candidate. Since the
primary election counts as an election, an individual could
have potentially given $2,000 to a candidate should he or
she be lucky enough to win the nomination. The amendments
also brought limitations on self-financing and attempted to
reign in independent expenditures.
Another important provision was the creation of a
partially publicly funded Presidential campaign, though
Congressional races were to have no public financing.
Since few Congressional members want to "rock the boat"
regarding their own finances, public funding for
Congressional races has never had much support. However,
the 1974 amendments brought spending limits to
Congressional races, despite the lack of a public financing
system; a feature that would later doom that particular
reform. As to the Presidential campaigns, candidates who
agree to certain spending limits, can qualify for matching
funds provided they reach a certain threshold of
contributions on their own to prove viability. Since the
1974 amendments all but two candidates have declined public
funding during the primary race (George W. Bush in 2000 and
53
2004, and John Kerry in 2004). Both however accepted
federal funds (and the spending limits mandated by
accepting those funds) in the general election. The 1974
amendments also brought newer, and stricter, standards of
disclosure and financial reporting into being. All of
these new regulations were to be monitored and enforced by
the newly created Federal Elections Commission (FEC). The
lack of will in enforcement that was associated with the
earlier acts was largely corrected.
The Demonstration Effect on the States
Though there were no "waves" of state level campaign
finance reform, there was a clear starting point for
reformers nationwide. With the abuses and embarrassment of
the Watergate affair that spurred federal reform came a
spillover effect onto several state governments. In
addition to the reforms that are key to the central thesis
of this work (individual contribution limits and public
financing), reforms included other restrictions that we
take for granted today including financial disclosure.
Prior to the FECA amendments of 1974, only a handful of
states required disclosure. By 1980, forty five had
enacted disclosure laws, and by 1996 all fifty states had.
But disclosure is the lightest of regulations from that
era, and would have little effect on individual
54
contribution behavior. The more substantive regulations
started out with a flurry; and were followed by steady
growth until present day.
Perhaps the most important restrictions from the FECA
laws were the individual contribution limits. These have
huge potential to affect the solicitation behavior of both
candidates and parties in the aftermath of the FECA,
especially before parties figured out the soft money game
(massive amounts of spending in advertisements stopping
just short of the Buckley decision's verboten words of
advocacy) in the 1990's. Ideally the FECA would end the
reliance upon large donors and force the parties and
candidates to broaden their donor pools. These same
principles behind the FECA and the abuses of Watergate were
used as a call to arms at the state level as well.
Prior to the FECA amendments of 1974, only four
states, Alaska, Kansas, Kentucky, and New Hampshire, had
any individual contribution limitations on state offices.
Almost immediately after the 1974 amendments, states began
to place individual contribution limits on state elective
offices. Figure 3.1 clearly shows this immediate flurry in
the numbers of states making some restriction on
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contributions in gubernatorial elections." Between the 1974
and 1978 election cycles the number of unlimited states
dropped from forty six to thirty. A busy four years
indeed! That frenzied pace obviously did not sustain
itself, but steady growth followed for the remainder of the
period to 2002.
Figure 3.1: Number of States Limiting Individual (in any
race) Campaign Contributions 1972-2002
A very similar trajectory of reform was seen in the
enactment of public financing regimes in state electoral
systems. Just as in the case of individual contribution
limits, there is a good deal of variation between the
5 The substance of these laws will be discussed in the next
section
.
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character of public financing systems that have been
enacted. Generally speaking there are three flavors of
public financing adopted by the states, each having
distinct policy goals (which will be discussed in the next
section) . The first and most common set gives direct
support to political parties. The second gives direct aid
to candidates. The third, which comprises of only a
handful of states, is a hybrid of the two. Figure 3.2
shows the number of states with some form of public
financing, be it to parties, candidates, or both. The same
general pattern that we saw with contribution limits is
virtually replicated. In 1974 only two states had any form
of public financing. By 1978 that number had shot up to
eleven. Clearly, the same flurry of legislation that was
inspired by the FECA carried over to the popularity of
public financing of some form in the stats. After the
initial flurry of activity, we see the same steady march of
reform carried through to 2000, at which point twenty four
states had some form of direct aid to political actors.
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Figure 3.2: Number of States with Public Financing of
Parties or Candidates 1972-2002
The Variety of State Campaign Finance Regimes
Now that the timeline of state campaign finance
reforms has been well established and that there has been
steady pressure by reformers placed upon the states to
change their finance systems since the FECA reforms of the
early 1970 's, we must make a closer examination of the
substance of the reforms in order to assess what effects
they may have on individual contribution behavior. Thus
far, we have simply implied that state campaign finance
regimes are truly a mosaic of regulations. Careful
attention must now be paid to further define exactly what
that mosaic looks like in the various hues and incarnations
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that states give them in their varying policies. Since the
causal theory of the indirect institutional effects centers
around the two key facets of campaign finance law-
individual limits and public financing- we shall focus
entirely on the variation between the states in these areas
in the pages to come.
Contribution Limits
The demonstration effect that the FECA amendments had
on the states was clearly shown in both the flurry of state
legislation and the forms that they took. Between 1974 and
1978 sixteen states adopted some form of contribution
limits on most state elective offices. Recall from Figure
3.1 that after that initial burst of legislative activity,
slower, yet steady, pressure from reformers resulted in a
fairly constant growth rate in the number of states
limiting individual contributions to candidates. Yet this
dichotomous indicator of a state limiting or not limiting
individual contributions is not sensitive enough to get a
qualitative grasp on the scope of these reforms.
To get a better feel for the degree of restrictiveness
these limits had. Table 3.1 presents the various individual
contribution limits in gubernatorial elections by state per
two-year election cycle. More often than not, states
enacted a similar "per election" limitation in the mold of
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the FECA, that distinguished between primary and general
elections. Most of the states that enacted limits between
1974 and 1978, chose to place fairly tight limits upon
individual contributors. Ten of the sixteen states placed
limits of $3,000 or less per cycle. As Malbin and Gais
(1998) note:
Most states' reforms during the 1970 's focused on
candidates... Contribution limits, on the whole, banned
only the largest gifts. To the extent that equalizing
power was an objective during the 1970 's, the idea
primarily was to reduce the role of the biggest
players. (13-15)
Just as the intent of the FECA was to reduce the roles of
very largest dollar contributors at the federal level like
Vesco, Stone, and others vho were handing shopping bags
full of cash to The Committee to Re-elect the President
(CREEP); so too was the intent in those vanguard states.
Upon further examination of Table 3.1, there was steady
movement of states towards lower contribution limits. As
time marched on, more states moved from unlimited and high
limit regimes towards tighter limit regimes.
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Table 3.1: State Contribution Limits in Gubernatorial
Elections in 1978, 1990, and 2002. 6
Limit (in
dollars
)
1978 1990 2002
0-999 MT, VT
1,000-1,999 MT, NJ AZ
,
MT AK, AZ
,
FL, ME,
MA
2,000-2,999 AK, AR, DE, ME, AK, CA, DE, ME, AR, DE, KY, MN,
MD, MA, SD, VT, MD, MA, SD, VT, RI, SD, WA, WV,
WY WV, WY WY
3,000-3,999 MI AR, MI, NJ MI
4,000-4,999 HI, KS, RI KS, MD
5,000-5,999 CT, KS CT CT, NJ, TN
6,000-6,999 FL, KY, NC FL HI
7,000-7,999 SC
8,000-8,999 KY, NC GA, NC
9,000-9,999
10,000+ NH, OK, WI LA, MN, NH, NY, CA, CO, ID, LA,
OK, WI NV, NH, NY, OH,
OK, WI
Unlimited AL, AZ
,
CA, CO, AL, CO, GA, ID, AL, IL, IN, IA,
GA, HI, ID, IL, IL, IN, IA, MS, MS, MO, NB, NM,
IN, IA, LA, MN, MO, NB, NV, NM, ND, OR, PA, TX,
MS, MO, NB, NV, ND, OH, OR, PA, UT, VA
NM, NY, ND, OH, SC, TN, TX, UT,
OR, PA, RI, sc, VA, WA
TN, TX, UT, VA,
WA, wv
Table 3.2 presents essentially the same dynamic seen
in gubernatorial limits in the limits created for
candidates to the state's upper legislative chamber. A
common, though not universal trend, was for states to enact
progressively lower contribution limits for constitutional
and legislative offices. This was a reflection of the
higher costs of running for the high profile state-wide
position of governor as compared to other constitutional
offices and district level offices. Some states such as
All dollar amounts referred to herein are not adjusted for
inflation, unless specifically noted.
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Minnesota had huge differences between these limits. In
the 1984 election cycle an individual could contribute
$72,000 to a gubernatorial candidate, $60,000 to an
attorney general candidate, $11,000 to any other statewide
office candidate, $1,800 to a state senate candidate, and a
mere $900 to a state house candidate. That imbalance
remained (though to a lesser degree) until the 1996
election cycle. New Jersey also has a unique distinction
here in that contributions to gubernatorial candidates are
strictly limited, but all other offices are not. This
apparent fluke is the result of the public financing system
in place for gubernatorial candidates. Since no financing
system exists for other offices, limits were seen as
unnecessary by the legislature.
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Table 3.2: State Contribution Limits in Legislative (Upper
Chamber) Elections in 1978, 1990, and 2002.
Limit (in
dollars
)
1978 1990 2002
0-999 MI
,
MT, SD MN, MT, SD AZ
,
ME, MN, MT,
SD, VT
1,000-1,999 CT, DE, KS AZ
,
CT, DE, FL, AK, CT, DE, FL,
KS, MI MA, MI, WA
2,000-2,999 AK, AR, FL, ME, AK, CA, ME, MD, AR, ID, KS, KY,
MD, MA, VT, WI
,
MA, VT, WV, WI, RI, SC, TN, WV,
WY WY WI, WY
3,000-3,999 AR
4,000-4,999 HI, RI GA, HI, MC, NJ
5,000-5,999 LA CO, LA
6,000-6,999 KY, NC CA
7,000-7,999
8,000-8,999 KY, NC NC
9,000-9,999
10,000+ NH, OK NH, OK NV, NH, NY, OH,
OK
Unlimited AL, AZ
,
CA, CO, AL, CO, GA, ID, AL, IL, IN, IA,
GA, HI, ID, IL, IL, IN, IA, MS, MS, MO, NB, NM,
IN, IA, LA, MN, MO, NB, NV, NJ, ND, OR, PA, TX,
MS, MO, NB, NV, NM, NY, ND, OH, UT, VA
NJ, NM, NY, ND, OR, PA, SC, TN,
OH, OR, PA, RI, TX, UT, VA, WA
SC, TN, TX, UT,
VA, WA, W
V
The cases of Minnesota and New Jersey though were
definitely outliers in this regard. Most other states had
a more "proportional" progressive scale. For much of the
period examined here, New York used a formula based on the
population of a jurisdiction to set the individual
contribution limit. It too yielded a progressively higher
limit from State Assembly, to State Senate, and to
statewide office candidates. Figure 3.3 shows the average
contribution limits for the four classes of political
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candidates spanning from 1978 to 2002. In the initial
flurry of reform, those states that had limits were
relatively restricted compared to the years to come. Not
all states made such distinctions between the various
classes of elective office in creating their contribution
limits. States such as Alaska, Kentucky, New Hampshire
(three of the four states with pre-FECA contribution
limits), and about a dozen others, were content to set a
single contribution limit for all elective offices.
Figure 3.3: Average State Contribution Limits to
Gubernatorial, Constitutional, and Legislative Campaigns
1978-2002
.
House Limit Senate Limit
Const Limit Gov Limit
Source : FEC
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Throughout the time series, the average contribution
limits of legislative offices are both quite consistent and
closely mated. The noticeable spike in the gubernatorial
limits as opposed to other statewide offices in 1982 is
largely explained by states such as Minnesota, New York,
and Louisiana moving from unlimited contributions to
extremely high contribution limits of $10,000 or higher
(thus skewing the average). But by the mid 1990's the gap
between the gubernatorial and constitutional office limits
had narrowed as more states began to enact stricter limits.
The spike at the end of the time-span is largely explained
by two factors skewing the averages. First, successful
court challenges to strict finance regimes (which will be
discussed in the proceeding section on public financing) in
the states of California, Colorado, and Oregon, forced
those states to revert to the older, higher limits.
Second, the three states of Idaho, Nevada, and Ohio went
from unlimited regimes to limits of $10,000. Absent these
"curve busters," the general trend of more restrictive
finance regimes would stay largely intact.
Despite these overarching trends that we have seen
over the past thirty years of legislation, we are still
left in a position with a great deal of variation between
states over the entire span of the time series tested in
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Chapter 4 (1984-2000). The variation in state contribution
restrictions is widely distributed by region, state
population, state population density, "redness" or
"blueness," or most other classifications imaginable. This
variation is critical in testing whether state laws
influence the likelihood of political donations.
Public Financing of Elections
Naturally, the diversity amongst the systems of public
financing between the states are as diverse and widely
varied as the variation between contribution limits that
some states choose to erect. Though the percentage of
states that have some form of public financing is lower
than the number of states that have contribution limits,
slightly less than half of all states subsidize political
campaigns in some fashion. The nature of this inquiry
requires us to paint in somewhat broad strokes to
operationalize the underlying thesis quantitatively,
however we do need to create a taxonomy of state campaign
finance systems that is sensitive enough to reflect this
variation between public finance systems of state
elections. The simplest distinction between the state
systems of public finance is whether the beneficiaries of
the financing are the candidates or the parties. Besides
the obvious difference in who receives the funding, as we
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shall see, this reflects a difference in political culture
between the states and how they create incentives to
strengthen (or weaken) the roles of specific political
actors. Table 3.3 presents these classifications as of
2002 .
Table 3.3: Public Financing Programs Across the States 2002
No Direct Candidate
Support
Direct Candidate
Support
No Party Support AK, AR, CA, CO, CT,
DE, GA, IL, KS, LA,
MS, MO, MT, NV, NH,
NY, ND, OK, OR, PA,
SC, SD, TN, TX, WA,
WV, WY
FL, HI, MD, MA,
MI, NE, NJ, VT,
WI
Direct Party
Support
AL, ID, IN, IA, NM,
OH, UT, VA
AZ, KY, ME, MN,
NC, RI
Public Party Financing Programs
The simplest form of public financing comes in the
shape of party subsidies. Though there are a variety of
incarnations across the states, compared to candidate
funding systems, they are rather straight forward.
Funding for the party subsidies generally comes from one of
two sources. Five of the eight states that have party only
financing derive their funds from state income tax checkoff
systems, similar to the federal system. When filing tax
returns, taxpayers can set aside a given amount (usually a
few dollars) to go into the subsidy program without raising
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the amount of their tax burden. Two states, Alabama and
Virginia, have "add-on" systems where a taxpayer's tax
burden will increase if they want to contribute to their
states' program. Indiana has a unique program that is
better insulated from taxpayers' fickle moods by siphoning
proceeds from automobile vanity plates to their party
subsidies. Distribution of the funds is also rather
simple. In the Alabama, Idaho, Iowa, New Mexico, Utah, and
Virginia programs, they allow individuals to direct their
contributions to the party of their choice. The remaining
states, Indiana and Ohio, have a formula for distribution
amongst qualifying parties.
One unifying theme that seems to emerge from the
pattern of public party financing is that the political
culture of the states that adopt this reform, tend to be
political environments that favor strong party
organizations and are less restrictive of interest group
activities. Consequently they erect fewer restraints on
the various types of political giving across the board. In
short, these states see value in the pluralistic system of
strong parties and groups competing in a relatively
unregulated political environment. Both Jones (1981) and
Malbin and Gais (1998) take note of this relationship of
reform and political culture. By offering direct aid to
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political parties, by whatever mechanism a state employs,
they are strengthening key linkage institutions between
constituencies and elected officials, thus fostering a
critical form of political representation. The “party
only" moniker is also a bit of a misnomer in that the
existence of such a program does not preclude candidates
from receiving benefits indirectly. All states that have
these party funding systems allow parties to make transfers
from party coffers to state candidate campaign funds, thus
infusing them with some public subsidized funds. Not only
does this strengthen the power and role of the party in the
state system vis-a-vis the candidate, it again strengthens
the party as a critical linkage institution between
constituents and policy makers.
Evidence of this tendency to create a more unregulated
environment of political contributions can be gleaned from
comparisons between restrictions on different modes of
political giving and whether a state has party subsidies.
Table 3.4 shows the relative levels of restrictions on PAC
contributions to individual candidates by state. Of the
eight states that offer direct party aid alone, six have no
restrictions on PAC contributions to candidates. This
relationship is even stronger between states that offer
party aid and have high individual candidate contribution
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limitations. When Table 3.3 is compared to Table 3.1,
seven of the eight states that offer direct party aid only
have either unlimited individual contribution limits or
limits of $10,000 or more.
Table 3.4: PAC Candidate Contribution Limits Across the
States 2000
PAC Candidate
Contribution Limit
States
Unlimited AL, CA, IL, IN, IA, MS, NE
,
NM,
ND, OR, PA, SD, TX, UT, VA, WY
High Limits ($5,000+) MD, NV, NJ, NY, NC, TN
Moderate Limits ($1,001- AR, DE, GA, HI, ID, KY, LA, MI,
4,999) NH, OH, IK, SC, WA, WV
Low Limits ($1,000 or AK, AR, AZ, CT, FL, KS
,
ME, MA,
less
)
MN, MO, MT, RI, VT, WI
Public Candidate Funding Programs
In general terms, public candidate funding programs
tend to be as complex and varied as the party financing
programs are simple. Yet, despite these complexities and
variations, it is quite easy to tease out some fundamental
similarities that justify the dichotomous qualitative
measure necessary for the modeling to come.
Just as was the case for party subsidies, states draw
their funding for candidate subsidies from a variety of
sources. Ten of the thirteen states offering some form of
candidate funding (Arizona, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, North Carolina, Rhode
Island, and Wisconsin), draw their revenues from a tax
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checkoff system. The remaining three use a variety of
sources. For example: Florida uses direct appropriations,
political filing fees, vehicle registrations, and a variety
of other sources to fund their program. Maryland and
Vermont use similar variations. Minnesota also enhances
its checkoff program by literally paying their residents to
make political contribution through a fifty dollar income
tax credit. In his successful 1998 gubernatorial campaign,
James Janos, used this system wisely by including details
of the refund system in his direct mail solicitations,
which took a tone of: "Why not contribute? You will get
your money back." Also, he was able to secure several
hundred thousand dollars in loans by his qualification for
public money. Though he was certainly not the first, or
last, candidate to do so, he certainly took full advantage
of this system in raising his seed money for his insurgent
campaign. One can easily hypothesize that such incentives
may well lead to higher contribution rates. Arizona offers
a refund as well, though for a paltry five dollars.
There is also a fair degree of similarity in what all
but one of the states that provide funding for candidates
(Rhode Island). They limit eligibility of candidates to
those who can raise a threshold of either a fixed dollar
amount or a set percentage of the spending limit (which is
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usually a condition of taking public subsidies). Usually
(in all cases save three), states place the additional
hurdle of forcing the candidate to raise qualification
funds with contribution limits far short of the general
individual contribution limit. Some states like Michigan,
Hawaii, and Wisconsin have the qualification funds limited
to $100. Minnesota drops their limit down to $50 in
qualification donations. This shared trait, reflects the
political culture of these states that tend to be wary of
consolidation of political power in the hands of an elite
as opposed to the grassroots. Perhaps Malbin and Gais
describe this tendency best by saying these states are,
"trying to enhance the political involvement of
"grassroots" supporters — that is, individual donors
who give small amounts to candidates with whom they
interact directly. From this perspective, parties —
like many interest groups — cannot be a solution; they
are more likely to be perceived as part of the
problem." (55)
These incentive structures the states are providing with
these qualification requirements are deliberately created
in indirectly fostering the conditions favorable to
individual contributions. Of all the traits of the
candidate funding programs, perhaps this is the most
important in fostering a culture of political giving. And
given the similarity between the states in this regard, a
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dichotomous variable reflecting this quality would seem
quite appropriate substantively.
Where the systems vary the most is in how the money is
distributed to candidates; yet here too there are enough
similarities to suggest that a fundamental level, the
substantive similarities outweigh the differences. Most
states reserve their candidate subsidies for the most high
profile statewide races. In the states of Kentucky,
Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, and
Vermont, public subsidies are reserved for gubernatorial
contests as of 2002. Florida, Massachusetts, and Rhode
Island infuse gubernatorial and other constitutional
offices. While a growing number of states offer subsidized
legislative races as well, including: Arizona, Hawaii,
Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, and Wisconsin. Even in the
states that limit the public subsidies to gubernatorial
contests alone, the indirect effects that this practice
should have in prompting people to contribute should exist
to some degree; especially since these are the most high
profile races in the state. So long as some candidates are
seeking public funding, and in most elections in these
states someone does, the qualification requirements should
create incentives to those candidates to solicit hard for
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those necessarily small contributions. Thus, contribution
rates should be higher.
The Politics of Campaign Finance Reform
Like many other issues in American politics, the issue
of campaign finance reform pits reformers against
standpatters who both have doomsday predictions of the
consequences of the other group's actions, against the
backdrop of an ambivalent and increasingly cynical American
public. Despite the real ambivalence of the American
people on this issue, there is a vibrant political debate
going on about the merits and demerits of the campaign
finance reform and its consequences, be they intended or
unintended. Also, as noted earlier, there has been a
steady progression of state reforms being adopted across
the country in the past thirty years showing evidence that
reformers have had success in convincing both political
elites and the general public that reforms are both
necessary and beneficial. Though both sides have their
rather vulgar and often times silly and reactionary
rhetoric directing their actions, there is a more nuanced
and intellectual debate between the two camps that begs the
question central to this inquiry: Is campaign finance
reform effective in its aims to broaden political
participation?
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Public Opinion on Campaign Finance Reform
Ambivalence is perhaps the best characterization of
the attitude that the American people have regarding
campaign finance reform. In general terms, when Americans
are asked about their positions on the campaign finance
system, they are rather critical of the status quo, are
unsure of what the laws are, and are usually welcoming of
the most commonly discussed reform proposals. Yet when
pushed beyond their initial reactions, the issue is not
particularly salient nor are their opinions strongly held
(Mayer 2001).
In what is perhaps the most detailed survey of
American's attitude on the subject, the American Politics
Survey (APS) conducted after the 2000 election by Grant and
Rudolph, respondents clearly showed skepticism of the
finance system. Sixty nine percent of the respondents
believed that the current finance system is in need of
substantial repair or complete replacement. Despite the
rather broad support of reform, respondents had mixed
results in their knowledge of the status quo. A majority,
sixty two percent, knew that individual contributions were
limited. Yet only thirty one percent knew parties could
take in certain types of unlimited contributions, failing
to show the basic distinction between soft money and hard
75
money (though the question cleverly avoided those terms).
Soldiering on deeper into the darkness, a vast majority of
respondents favored limiting Congressional candidate
spending, limiting television advertising, and eliminating
soft money contributions. Paradoxically, fifty four
percent indicated they would like to see all contribution
limitations eliminated on condition of full disclosure and
reporting. Given this messiness in public opinion, it
should come as no surprise then that the salience and
priority that citizens attach to campaign finance reform is
quite low. This leaves them in a position where their
opinion at any given point in time may in fact be quite
malleable or unstable.
It is this general sense of dissatisfaction of the
campaign finance system and the apparent malleability of
public opinion that has allowed the reform movement to gain
momentum in many of its political fights. A curious
development in the politics of campaign reform has been the
advent of the "clean elections" movement. These are a set
of reforms at the state level that essentially eliminate
private contributions outside of the initial phase of the
primary campaign. These proposals have been debated in a
handful of states over the past ten years. Though the
ubiquity of this movement is dramatically overstated by
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reformers (especially given the low salience of the issue),
there is no doubt that reformers have taken advantage of
this malleability in the framing of the issue when it has
appeared before voters in initiatives. And given the
success of "clean money" initiatives in Arizona, Maine, and
Massachusetts, proper framing of the issue can cut through
the ambivalence and result in a resounding success for
reformers
.
The softness of popular opinion has led to both
supporters and opponents of reform to come to completely
different conclusions on public support when referring to
the exact same public opinion data. Since public opinion
is quite malleable, respondents in public opinion polls are
extremely susceptible to question wording and the way in
which the ordering of questions can establish a loaded
context. This happens even with the most neutrally worded
questions. The end result can be pushing the respondents
towards certain answers. Weissman and Hassan (2005), in a
report released by the Campaign Finance Institute, cite
extensive polling conducted from 1972 to 2000 individually
by Gallup, Mellman, The Los Angeles Times, and several
others as showing a strong support of public financing for
Congressional and Presidential elections. Samples (2003),
in a policy release from the Cato institute, refutes those
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findings with polling data from CBS-New York Times
,
US New
and World Report and Gallup/CNN/t/SA Today, showing great
public skepticism.
Not surprisingly both these reports dismiss the poll
results that go against the obvious normative position the
authors represent for essentially the same reasons.
Samples rejects the positive findings cited by Weismann and
Hassan since those polls avoided the wording "Tax money
involved," and since the questions on public finance
followed questions that referenced "problems" with "special
interests." Weismann and Hassan reject those very same poll
results that Samples lauds, since they used wording like
"Tax money involved," with no indication of how checkoffs
worked, and prefaced those questions with questions that
highlighted the costs of public finance systems putting the
eventual question on support for public finance in a loaded
context. Clearly, the normative baggage carried into both
of these analyses have directed the interpretations of
these polls results, but taken as a whole, the findings of
all the polling conducted on public financing can lead to
only one conclusion: public opinion is truly ambivalent and
can easily be pushed one way or another depending upon the
context
.
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Grant and Rudolph (2004) have explored the structure
of public opinion on campaign finance reform in the best
detail to date. Utilizing a controlled experiment on over
one thousand respondents, they found that individual
opinions on campaign finance reforms are largely driven by
interest group affect that individual's possess. Utilizing
the extensive behavioral studies on the effects of issue
framing, they carefully crafted their poll to classify
citizens based on their affect towards specific groups.
Then, by knowing how these select groups have framed this
particular issue, they found that this was a major factor
in determining their position on most issues of campaign
finance. Not surprisingly, the way this issue has been
framed is the familiar tension in American politics between
the reformers emphasizing political equality and the
standpatters basing their arguments on freedom of speech.
The Politics of Reform
Having established the ambivalence of public opinion
above, it is now understandable how the issue can take on
as vibrant of a public debate as it has. Again, support is
dependent upon the framing of the issue. When the issue is
successfully framed and raised by reformers, popular
victories in state initiatives can come for the very reason
that most Americans have such soft opinions regarding the
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use of public funding for political campaigns. Generally
speaking, virtually all of the proponents of campaign
finance reform, especially those of clean election laws,
frame the issue in terms of equality. To most reformers,
the increasing importance of money in politics that comes
with the rising costs of elections, is threatening the
basic democratic values of equality and equal
representation. Essentially, they claim, economic power is
being converted to political power. Only well financed
interests have a viable voice in the political system.
Campaign finance reform can fix this imbalance by forcing
candidates and parties to broaden their financial base
beyond well financed interests; or in the case of clean
election laws, remove most private financing altogether.
The legal arguments that many scholars make in favor
of reforms reinforce this notion of reforms being an
equalizing force to bring in or buttress voices in the
political process that they feel have been suppressed by
the dominance of moneyed interests. Though every campaign
finance proposal brought forward by reformers has been
restrained by, and often times voided, in the legal fallout
of the Buckley decision, reformers have still managed to
make forceful and politically successful equality based
arguments. These arguments generally find their roots in
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the First Amendment or the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
First Amendment arguments typically are presented as
such: The intent of the freedom of speech guarantee in the
First Amendment should not be interpreted as an absolute
protection of individual autonomy through political speech
(thereby recognizing no legitimate restrictions on campaign
spending or fundraising). Rather, we must recognize that
the damage done to our democratic system through an
unregulated campaign finance system justifies regulation of
campaign finance; since the unfettered speech of an
economic elite snuffs out the ability of others to voice
their own political opinions. Simply put, properly
constructed campaign finance reform will increase the
fairness of our system by equalizing the power to create
political speech (Freedman 2000). Though this is a
regulation of speech, it is Constitutionally justified
since the state's interest of maintaining an equitable
political system fulfills the level of judicial scrutiny
that the Supreme Court requires for any degree of speech
regulation
.
This line of reasoning necessitates a thicker reading
of the First Amendment that recognizes that the totality of
the First Amendment protections must be understood as a
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package of rights to create and preserve an equitable
democratic system. Perhaps Neuborne (1999) sums this logic
up most eloquently:
James Madison's First Amendment is self-consciously
structured and organized as the life-cycle of a
democratic idea - an idea that begins in the recesses
of individual belief, is communicated to others
through speech and press, provokes collective action
through assembly and association, and finally matures
into public policy through formal interaction with the
political branches. It is no coincidence that the
textual rhythm of the First Amendment moves from
protection of internal conscience in the religion
clauses, to protection of individual expression in the
speech clause, to broad community-wide discussion in
the press clause, to concerted action in the assembly
(and implied association) clause, and, finally, to
formal political activity in the petition clause.
Indeed, no rights-bearing document in the Western
tradition approximates the precise organizational
clarity of the First Amendment as a road map of
democracy (1069).
To ignore the greater purpose of the First Amendment in
favor of a narrow understanding of the absolute rights of
individual autonomy will come at the price of accentuating
the imbalance of speech, and consequently political equity,
that now exists.
Scholars that emphasize Fourteenth Amendment rights of
equal protection also use the rhetoric of political
equality as the center of their reform case. Hasen (1999)
justifies the creation of a voucher system (a wholly public
system of finance where citizens direct a certain amount of
money to whichever political recipient they like) on
82
Fourteenth Amendment grounds. He along with others who
advocate this system, claim this would create a marketplace
of political ideas free of the economic inequities that are
endemic to the system today. Foley (1994) goes so far as
to forcibly argue for an additional amendment to the
Constitution to create a voucher system he dubs "Equal
Dollars Per Vote." Just how viable these voucher systems
would be is anyone's guess. Given the popularity of the
rough equivalent today (checkoff systems), one would be
justified in wondering how any candidate would be able to
mount an effective campaign with such low participation
rates. Perhaps enough people would strategically not
allocate their voucher just to be spared the television
commercials every other November! Aside from the practical
matters though, the equalizing effect of such voucher
systems and their Fourteenth Amendment genesis are clearly
visible
.
Others that utilize a Fourteenth Amendment argument
include Raskin and Bonifaz (1993). They claim that the
wealth of individuals essentially determine the viability
of their participation in the political system. They show
how the Court has used the principle of one person/one vote
in striking down grandfather clauses, white primaries, poll
taxes, long residency requirements, high candidate filing
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fees, and malapportioned legislative districts. All this
with ne intent of ensuring political equality. Arguing
that the political system is essentially, "Stacked and
closed" (276 ) and that, "wealthy interests... set the
parameters of political debate and the nature of the
legislative agenda", (277) we are left with a political
system in which effective participation is as exclusive as
it was in the dark days prior to those civil rights
decisions that opened the suffrage generations ago.
Consequently, they question the Supreme Court's
unwillingness to accept a political equity argument in
campaign finance regulations when they were willing to
justify those previous decisions regarding voting rights on
the grounds of political equity.
Correspondingly, opponents frame the issue in terms of
freedom of speech. By equating political spending with
free speech, as the Supreme Court did to a certain extent
in the Buckley decision, they simply argue that restricting
campaign contributions or expenditures necessarily reduces
individuals' political speech. Such speech should rightly
be protected under the First Amendment. Obviously, their
First Amendment claim against expenditure limits was
countenanced by the Supreme Court in Buckley, however their
claim against contribution limits fell on mostly deaf ears
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in that decision and the several that followed using
Buckley as precedent. That said, the case against
contribution limits as an abridgement against free speech
is still held by many in the scholarly and political
community, and more importantly by some Supreme Court
justices, namely Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas.
In the Buckley decision, the Court recognized that the
FECA Act and its subsequent amendments did in fact stifle
free speech rights by limiting contributions, but ceded
that the state had a interest in doing so to avoid
corruption, both real and perceived. The important legal
distinction though, was that they refused to apply the
standard of "strict scrutiny" on the question of campaign
contributions. Strict scrutiny is the Constitutional test
that is used for laws that burden "fundamental rights."
This has been the judicial standard applied to virtually
all forms of speech in the latter half of the twentieth
century. Instead, the Court opted for a standard of
"rational basis," which leaves tremendous deference to
legislatures and rarely leads to a Constitutional finding
against the law in question (Smith 2001, 111). However,
they explicitly rejected the political equity claim stating
that, "the concept that government may restrict the speech
of some elements of our society in order to enhance the
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relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment." This "mixed message" of a ruling infuriated
both reformers and standpatters alike, leaving both groups
with substantial feelings of defeat. Reformers lost their
beloved spending limits, and standpatters failed to have
strict scrutiny applied to the contribution limits.
Even though Buckley represented a setback to
standpatters in regards to contribution limits, they still
vociferously, forcefully, and cogently continue to make
those very claims in the legal literature. BeVier (1985)
expresses near disbelief that the Court has departed with
its, "customary strategy of overprotecting speech, in order
to protect speech that matters." (1087) Citing cases from
Schenk to Dennis to Brandenburg, she notes that the Court
in modern times has regularly deferred to free speech
rights over various state interests. Interests which in
this case, she feels are quite imagined (that of perceived
corruption). Sullivan (1997) argues that individual
contributions are simply a form of independent expenditure,
thus affording total protection from regulation, as the
Court has applied to any individual's independent
expenditure
.
Perhaps the most highly regarded legal critic of
contribution limits (and campaign finance regulation in
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general), Bradley Smith (2001), succinctly summed up the
case for applying the standard of strict scrutiny to
contribution limits stating:
Given the case history over many years, it is too
late, really, to argue that a gift of money is not a
form of protected symbolic speech, at least when made
to a political candidate. Such a gift is an action
intended to convey support for a candidate and, it is
generally presumed, his or her views. (114)
He dismisses the rational of Wright (1976), that money is
property only having incidental effect on speech and thus
subject to regulation, since money enables speech. If
Wright's supposition were to be accepted judicially, Smith
claims that nearly any form of speech could be regulated
simply by restricting spending on the activities
instrumental in exercising speech. By circumscribing this
fundamental political right of self-expression, the Court
has opened the door to destroying absolute rights, both of
individuals and of groups, for participation in the
political process, which is part of our liberal pluralist
tradition (Bopp and Coleson 2002).
Aside from reformers having the unenviable task of
gingerly stepping around the restrictions laid forth in
Buckley (which they often exceed ) , they also face a Supreme
Several popular initiatives from the 1990 's in California,
Oregon, and Missouri, and state constitutional provisions
in Minnesota have been voided in a series of cases in the
federal court system. The courts have generally seen these
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Court that has flatly rejected the political equality
argument in Buckley as a justification for regulation of
political speech. Compounding their fate, they also face
the methodological problem of a lack of legal parsimony.
Typically their legal theorizing is based on a much more
tenuous base of suppositions than those of their opponents.
The arguments of standpatters tend to be much clearer, more
concise, and simpler; thus having the potential for future
courts to find in their favor (Ortiz 1998). Moreover,
given the recent turnover in the Supreme Court, and the
publicly stated willingness on behalf of Justices Kennedy,
Scalia, and Thomas to revisit the findings of the Court in
Buckley, the reformers may be in for sad times ahead in
their legal fight. However, despite the legal obstacles
they have faced, politically they have faired much better
because of the sheer political appeal of the equity
argument
.
The legal arguments placed forward by the opponents
and proponents of campaign finance reform, as has been
hinted to thus far, have been the springboards in which
restrictions as abridging First Amendment speech rights,
since the state laws were far too broad and not well
tailored to accomplish the states' asserted goals. See:
California Prolife Council PAC v. Scully 164 F.3d 1189
(1999), Vannatta v. Keisling 900 F. Supp. 488 (1995,
Oregon), Carver v. Nixon 72 F.3d 633 (1995, Missouri), and
Day v. Holahan 34 F.3d 1356 (1994, Minnesota).
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they have made their greater political case to the general
public. As virtually every poll on the public's opinion on
campaign finance reform has shown, very few understand the
legal particulars of the issue, nor do they really care.
However, crafting an appealing and effective political
message around those legal issues allows political
activists to frame the issue in a particular fashion that
can stir up feelings and emotions of the general public to
generate a fair degree of salience around the issue. But,
this takes a concerted effort on the part of activists to
awaken those sentiments.
Armed with this powerful rhetoric of political
equality in a political atmosphere of high political apathy
and cynicism, it should come as no surprise that reformers
have had several successes politically at both the state
and federal levels in recent years. At the state level,
reformers have been successful at winning popular victories
in nearly all of popular fights they have picked, be they
initiatives or constitutional amendments.
As a testament to the power of this rhetoric, the
1990 's and early 2000 's proved to be a remarkable time
period in the passage of campaign finance reform by popular
mechanisms. 1993 saw the passage of constitutional
amendments in Minnesota placing variable caps on spending
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and contribution limits to entice people to accept public
financing. 1994 saw the passage of the "Freedom From
Special Interests" initiative in Oregon that limited the
amount of contributions that come from outside a
legislative district. Also in that year, Missouri passed
very restrictive limits on individual contribution limits.
1996 was banner year for reformers. In Arkansas,
California, and Colorado voters approved tight restrictions
on individual contributions, as well as contributions by
PACs and other interests. Nevada placed tighter limits on
PAC contributions and beefed up its disclosure system,
while Montanan voters banned corporate contributions (but
not corporate PAC contributions) in campaigns concerning
ballot initiatives.
Clean elections laws were also part of this surge in
citizen initiative lawmaking. In 1996, Maine passed its
clean elections law after rejecting a similar proposal
several years before. 1997 brought a clean elections law
to Vermont, with Massachusetts following the next year.
And finally, 2000 brought a clean elections law to Arizona.
Of all the campaign finance reformers, the clean election
supporters obviously bring the most comprehensive proposals
with colorful rhetoric to support their cause. And it is
no coincidence that the rhetoric is centered on equity
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based arguments very similar to those that legal scholars
are forwarding.
Public Campaign, the premier group working to enact
clean elections laws in all the states and at the federal
level, uses these equality references frequently. In their
"Model Bill", on which they hope state and federal reforms
will borrow from, they claim that, "Common sense tells [the
American people] that genuine political equality and public
accountability - essential hallmarks of democracy - cannot
exist within a system in which money counts more than
votes." And by removing the need for candidates to raise
vast sums of money in elections they feel that the
disproportionate power of moneyed interests will be leveled
through this system of funding. Essentially they seek to
purify the finance system. They also believe that clean
elections schemes will promote more equity amongst the
kinds of candidates running for office, by removing the
imperative for candidates to be well connected to financial
interests to conduct a viable campaign. Clean elections,
"[a] Hows qualified individuals to mount competitive
campaigns regardless of their access to large contributors
or their economic status." By freeing candidates from the
financial burdens, they believe that these policies will
force clean elections candidates to pay attention to their
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political constituents, not financial constituents. The
result, they claim, is more equitable and responsive
candidates and representatives.
Given the success of these voter initiatives and clean
elections laws (and the relatively low number of defeats),
it is clear that in the political sense, reformers seem to
have the upper hand at this time. The equality-framed
argument has clearly won out over standpatters' free speech
concerns. The net effect of this, and the relevance to the
greater theme in this dissertation, is that to reformers
and their supporters, the intent of all these reforms is to
create more responsive government representing a more
active and less cynical public. In short, they want to
bring more people into the political arena. An arena in
which their voices cannot be silenced by large scale
contributors. In the end, reformers are trying to broaden
participation, and more specifically, widen the financial
base of political candidates, both by limiting
contributions and by forcing candidates to raise seed money
from numerous small sum donations. We shall now put that
supposition to an empirical test and see if greater
participation has indeed been the result of this thirty-
year crusade to reform campaign financing.
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CHAPTER 4
MODELING AN INDIVIDUAL'S CONTRIBUTION DECISON
Introduction
In the context of the American federal system, the
states are often referred to as "laboratories of
democracy." The reason for this is well known: the
autonomy that states have in several policy areas allows
for a great deal of policy innovation by state lawmakers in
several policy areas. Because of the great variation
amongst state laws in campaign finance, an excellent
opportunity exists to examine whether or not certain
campaign finance regimes create a culture of political
giving.
Simply put, the central thesis of this work is that
state campaign finance rules matter in predicting the
likelihood of an individual contribution. In addition to
the descriptive factors to be discussed shortly, I theorize
that there is an indirect causal relationship between
campaign finance regimes and contribution behavior.
Certain types of campaign finance laws such as low
contribution limits and public financing of candidates
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should place incentives upon political elites to broaden
their financial bases as much as possible. Those elites,
be they parties or candidates, react logically to the
incentive structures placed upon them and ramp up their
solicitation activities accordingly. This has a direct
payoff in the numbers of contributors brought into the
fold. As a result of this indirect causal mechanism,
citizens in states with low individual contribution limits
and public funding for candidates should be more likely to
contribute
.
A similar indirect causal mechanism should also exist
for states with high (or no) individual contribution limits
and public aid to political parties by creating less
incentive for parties and candidates to solicit campaign
funds. In theory, parties and candidates in these states
should be less compelled to aggressively solicit
contributions from as broad of a base as possible since
they can rely upon larger, or unlimited, contributions and
a degree of state support. Accordingly, citizens living in
these states should be less likely contribute than in the
states with low individual contribution limits and public
candidate support.
The assessment of the effects of campaign finance
regimes on the likelihood of an individual making a
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political contribution is necessarily a quantitative
exercise. The great challenge that awaits quantitative
researchers in this query is twofold. First, we must
capture the scope, magnitude, and details of any given
state's campaign finance system. Secondly, we must devise
a conceptual model that gauges whether or not certain
policies and procedures regarding campaign finance laws
affect the behaviors of political parties and candidates in
regards to political fundraising. The novelty of this
work, and by consequence its most significant contribution,
is that no one else to date has systematically analyzed the
effects of state campaign finance laws on the likelihood of
making an individual contribution by utilizing individual
level data. Ideally, this should shed some light on the
effectiveness of the most common types of campaign finance
reforms
.
Modeling the Contribution Decision
The rich body of literature examining the determinants
of political participation necessitates a carefully
constructed model, firmly based on several important
factors. Socio economic status, demographics, political
engagement, ambient political environment, and solicitation
have all been shown, by various researchers over the years,
as important factors in determining the likelihood of
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individuals participating in the political system across
various modes of participation. By statistical necessity,
these must be accounted for in any model as control
variables. In addition to these control variables, and of
most importance to the central thesis of this work, we must
carefully construct measures of both the restrictions in
campaign finance regimes and attempt to isolate other
important aspects of states' campaign finance systems that
may impact on an individual's contribution decision.
Back to SES
Any individual level model of political participation
is necessarily grounded in the respondents' socioeconomic
status (SES). Since political contribution is a vital mode
of participation, it is natural that any examination of the
factors that determine the likelihood of an individual to
contribute or not must include SES factors. As noted in
Chapter 2, early works tended to focus on the SES and
demographic characteristics of individuals and their
likelihood of voting (Burnham 1982, 1987; Hill and
Leighley, 1992; Leighley and Nagler, 1992; Reiter, 1979;
Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Sheilds and Goidel, 1997;
Teixeira, 1987, 1992). Since this work is a natural
extension of the broader participation literature, the SES
factors that are associated with higher degrees of voting
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participation, should have the same relevance across the
other modes of participation, including political
contributing
.
Figure 4.1: Candidate Contribution Rate by Income Quintile
1984-2000
Figure 4.1 shows a clear relationship between income and
contribution rates in percentage terms in the National
Election Studies (NES) respondents from the years 1984-
2000. The contribution rate to candidates in the highest
income quintile was 19.1 percent as opposed to the lowest
income quintile of 1.2 percent; over a fifteen-fold
difference. Clearly (and for obvious reasons in
differences in disposable income), political contributing
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is a middle to upper-class mode of participation. Figure
4.2 shows the relationship between education and candidate
contributions
.
Figure 4.2: Candidate Rate Contribution by Education 1984-
2000
Again, as in the case of income, as the level of education
rises, the likelihood of contributing rises dramatically.
However, the difference in contribution rates are not quite
as sharp. For those who only completed grade school the
candidate contribution rate was 1.4 percent of the sample,
as opposed to 11.7 percent for college graduates.
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Demographics
Early work on political participation also explored
demographic factors that drove participation levels. There
has long been a clear difference in the participation rates
between whites and racial minorities. Again, those
studying the effects of race on participation outlined in
Chapter 2 have found a much more complex relationship
between participation and race than a simple negative
correlation that is often assumed (Gutterbock and London,
1983; Leighley and Vedlitz, 1999; Olsen, 1970; Orum, 1966;
Shaw, de la Garza, and Lee, 2000). Whether this "excess"
participation in voting that Gutterbock and London refer to
will translate to checkbook participation is doubtful.
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Figure 4.3: Candidate Contribution Rate by Race 1984-2000
Whites Non-whites
Source: NES
Figure 4.3 calls this into question by showing a marked
disparity between self-identified minority respondents and
whites. The excess participation as described by scholars
is in participation modes that are largely "free" in that
most do not require a monetary outlay (voting, community
activism, campaign volunteering, etc). Rather, these modes
rely upon participants giving the equally precious resource
of time and energy, something that is more easily given by
those in lower income levels, than a monetary contribution.
Consequently, excess participation should be less likely in
a mode that cuts into the discretionary income of a
potential participant.
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The positive relationship between age and political
participation must also be taken into account in the model.
As discussed in Chapter 2, as an individual ages a whole
host of transformations occur: higher levels of education,
better work conditions, greater strength of partisanship,
more community attachments, growing church attendance, and
greater family income to name a few. All of these factors
net out to a greater level of political participation as an
individual advances in the life cycle (Campbell, 1971;
Glenn and Grimes, 1968; Stoker and Jennings, 1995; Strate,
Parrish, Elder, and Ford 1989; Verba and Nie, 1972).
Gender differences have also been apparent in
political participation. Women have traditionally been far
behind men in their participation rates across the various
modes of participation. Even though the voting
participation rate difference has evaporated, and indeed
women's voting rate has passed that of men, women's
contribution rates are far behind that of men. Figure 4.4
shows that despite the reversal of the gender gap in
regards to voting rates, the gender gap is in fact widening
in terms of campaign contributions. This vast gender gap
is even more acute amongst the "significant" political
donors ($200 or more) that Francia et al (2003) have shown.
Perhaps the best explanation of this disparity is described
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in the resource model of participation that Brady, Burns,
Nie, Scholzman, and Verba described in Chapter 2. Because
of discrimination and ill treatment in the social and
economic institutions that are "pathways to participation,"
women face a systematic gap in the resources that
facilitate participation. Given this large distinction
between males and females in political contributions,
gender must be accounted for in the model.
Figure 4.4: Candidate Contribution Rate by Gender 1984-2000
Males Females
Source : NES
Political Engagement and Environment
Several underlying factors regarding the respondents'
levels of political engagement, interest, and knowledge
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must also be accounted for. These factors have been noted
throughout the literature as determinants of both general
participation and contribution. Strength of partisanship,
interest in and knowledge of politics, have been integral
(and more importantly significant) components of virtually
every model of contribution, and most models of other modes
of participation (Grant and Rudolph 2002, Rosenstone and
Hansen 1993, Verba et al 1995).
The ambient political environment that the respondent
is exposed to in the election cycle is also of critical
importance in shaping an individual's contribution
decision. In virtually all models of participation
(especially those focusing on contribution), electoral
competition is accounted for in at least one of the
variables. Increased electoral competition, a critical
ambient political circumstance, raises individuals'
attentions to the political process and stimulates
political candidates and parties to mobilize the
electorate. The increased awareness, coupled with
mobilization efforts, should stimulate greater contribution
rates. This segues nicely into what is perhaps one of the
most important party activities that prompts an individual
into making a political contribution: solicitation.
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Solicitation
The critical role of the parties in stimulating
citizens to participate in the various ways our system
allows is perhaps best summed up by Rosenstone and Hansen.
"Few people participate spontaneously in politics.
Participation, instead, results when groups, political
parties, and activists persuade citizens to take part
(36)." The relationship between the act of contributing
and party solicitation has been best explored by Grant and
Rudolph (2002). Using data collected following the 2000
election, they have shown that solicitations from both
parties and candidates often have the most substantive
impact on an individual's calculus to contribute or not.
Accordingly, solicitations must be accounted for in any
model of political contributing.
Campaign Finance Regulations
Comparative studies of voter turnout between the US
and other advanced industrialized democracies of the world,
as reviewed in Chapter 2, brought the quick realization
that institutional arrangements and legal restrictions may
have a significant impact on participation rates. A whole
host of scholars began to make predictions on how legal
reforms of the registration system would result in an
increase in turnout. Though these predictions ranged from
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rather marginal to substantial increases, they all
illustrated the importance of legal arrangements in
promoting citizen participation in the political system
(Brown, Jackson, and Wright, 1999; Highton, 1997; Highton
and Wolfinger, 1998; Jackman, 1987; Mitchell and Wlezien,
1995; Piven and Cloward, 1989; Powell, 1986; Teixeira,
1992; Timpone, 1998; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980).
These works on voting participation coupled together with
the recent research explored earlier by Hogan (2005)
concerning interest group behavior and state restrictions,
and Shields and Goidel (2000) focusing on the effects of
the FICA reforms on contribution, suggest that campaign
finance regulations may have a significant effect on
different actors' likelihood of participation. Therefore
it is most appropriate for researchers to move "beyond SES"
and focus on state campaign finance regimes in an attempt
to better understand contribution behavior.
Data and Analysis
Utilizing pooled data from the National Election
Studies (NES) from 1984-2000, several binary logistic
models are employed to test various hypotheses regarding
the effects of campaign finance laws on individual
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contribution behavior. 8 Logistic regression estimates the
likelihood of a binary outcome (the dependent variable).
The dependent variable in any binary logistic model is a
categorical variable. That is, you can model the
likelihood of any event or situation with a binary outcome.
Generally these values are coded 0 for a negative outcome
(the event did not occur), or 1 for a positive outcome (the
event did occur). Examples of binary outcomes are easy to
come by. Did a person vote? Did a student finish the
dissertation? The magnitude of the effects that the
independent variables have on the dependent variables are
reflected in the coefficients.
The NES is the most complete survey of Americans'
political attitudes and behaviors spanning back to 1948.
Every two years, anywhere between roughly 1500 and 2500
respondents are randomly selected from the general
population, and asked hundreds of questions regarding all
aspects of political opinions and behaviors. In addition,
most demographic attributes of the respondents are covered
as well. The data from 1984-2000 is of particular interest
for two primary reasons. In this range of years,
s
In the construction and interpretation of logistic
equations, the use of good software is critical. The
software package used in this analysis is Stata8, using the
categorical data analysis patch developed by Long and
Freese ( 2001 ) .
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respondents are asked to differentiate between the
recipients of their political contributions. Of particular
interest for this study is the distinction between
candidate and party contributions to determine differential
effects of state campaign finance regimes on these two
unique types of giving. Respondents in the previous years
were simply asked whether or not a political contribution
was made. Shields and Goidel (1997) used pooled NES data
dating from 1952. However, they lose some important
distinctions between these different acts. Another equally
important factor in choosing to use these years in the time
series analysis is to avoid the effects of federal campaign
finance law changes in the 1970's. As the central focus of
Shields and Goidel 's work was to gauge peoples'
contribution behaviors under different federal campaign
finance regimes, they needed to have their time series span
the pre and post FECA eras. In this work, it is critical
that federal campaign finance laws stay constant, so
differential behaviors can be attributed to other campaign
finance laws: those of the states. Necessarily, the range
of years must exclude the 2004 election cycle to avoid any
effects that the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 may
have had.
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Consideration must also be given to the
appropriateness of using the NES variables that ask whether
a contribution was made to a political candidate or a party
without differentiating between whether the recipient of
the contribution was at the state or federal level. It
must be clearly stated that the assumptions behind this
model do not treat all contributors within the NES dataset
as state contributors alone. Rather, they recognize that
federal contributors will affect the results in a
predictable way.
I contend that for a variety of reasons this is a
sound practice. First, since federal laws apply evenly to
contributors throughout the country, there should be no
differential effect from state to state on federal
contributions. Other factors accounted for in the model
will be driving the contribution calculus. Consequently,
any differential effects between types of state regimes can
then be attributed to the variation in state laws. Second,
the bias that exists in the model is towards no finding.
Put differently, respondents who give to federal candidates
and parties will create a fair amount of statistical
"noise." If statistically significant and substantive
differences emerge between state campaign finance regime
types, it is all the more remarkable since the federal
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contributors will, statistically speaking, be pulling the
parameters of the state law variables down. Finally, on a
purely practical level, this is the best data available at
this time. No other time series asks this question in a
way that would suit this query perfectly.
The Variables
State Campaign Finance Regimes
The independent variables of most interest are those
that describe the campaign finance regimes of the states.
To capture the whole system of campaign finance, it is
necessary to include multiple variables. The key
institutional arrangements that may shape an individual's
contribution behavior are contribution limits and public
finance regimes.
Recall the discussion in Chapter 2 regarding the
indirect causal relationship between campaign finance
regimes and individual contributing. The political elite
of a state, be they candidates or parties, will react to
incentive structures placed upon them by campaign finance
regimes. Lower contribution limits should force candidates
and parties to broaden their financial support by seeking
out as many contributors as possible, as opposed to parties
and candidates in states with high or unlimited
contribution laws that can rely on a smaller number of
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large contributions. By necessity the political elite in
restricted states will ratchet up their solicitation
networks to make up the difference. As the literature has
shown quite clearly, solicitation is among the best, if not
the best, determinant of a contribution. Thus, we must
devise a sound measure that reflects the restrictiveness of
the contribution limits to gauge whether or not this
indirect causal relationship exists.
Public financing should also be an important factor in
determining the likelihood of a contribution. To briefly
restate the hypothesis: Citizens residing in states with
public financing schemes benefiting candidates should be
more likely to make a political contribution. States that
have direct candidate support create a very clear incentive
structure for candidates to increase the number of
contributors: they require it for qualification. Voters
living in these states should expect more solicitations,
and as a result will be more likely to make a contribution.
Citizens residing in states that have public support of
parties should be less likely to contribute since their
political elites may be under less pressure to raise money
and be less intensive in their solicitations. Creating
variables to capture these different systems is necessary,
yet quite simple.
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The Measurement of Contribution Limits
In order to best account for the wide variation of
contribution limits in the states, several different
methods were attempted. Using the sage advise of William
of Ockham, that simple explanations are generally preferred
over complex explanations riddled with numerous assumptions
(Ockham's Razor), a simple binary variable was constructed
to indicate unlimited contribution limits across the
various state political offices. As was discussed in
Chapter 3, most states that have contribution limits have
varying levels of limits depending upon the office that the
candidate is seeking. Most, with the exception of New
Jersey (which has a significantly lower limit for
gubernatorial candidates), have progressively lower
individual contribution limits on constitutional office,
senate, and house contenders. Coding these variables is
simple matter of 1 for unlimited contributions and 0 for
limits. Initial models employing this dichotomous coding
were plagued with problems, particularly multicollinearity
and sensitivity. Indeed, they were too simple.
A problem endemic to binary variables in cases that in
reality show a high degree of variation, is that forcing a
dichotomous outcome is insensitive to the degrees of
variation. For example, is there a substantive difference
111
between unlimited contributions in the state of Iowa and a
$10,000 limit in New Hampshire? The constriction on
individuals' behaviors or the fundraising strategies
employed by candidates should not differ greatly since to
most potential contributors, a $10,000 limit is essentially
no limit. This insensitivity is just as apparent within
the category of "limited" states. The incentives to both
candidate's fundraising activities and potential
contributors is entirely different in New Hampshire with
those $10,000 limits than the $400 limit across the
Connecticut River in Vermont for gubernatorial candidates.
To correct for the shortcomings in sensitivity of the
binary categories, an ordinal scale was employed across the
various levels of office to reflect the restrictiveness of
campaign contribution limits. The ordinal categories
ranged from 1 to 11. This is similar to the ordinal
categories that were employed by Hogan (2005) to show the
restrictiveness of state contribution limits on political
action committees. Though an interval level measure would
be preferable (i.e. entering the exact limit), this leaves
a problem of coding those states with unlimited
contributions. The highest ordinal category (11) are
states that are either unlimited or have limits above
$10,000. This scale more accurately reflects the
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distinctions between low limit states, high limit states,
and unlimited contribution states.
As sensitive as this measurement is, a problem that
would crop up repeatedly in the preliminary models that
employed the ordinal scales and binary indicators of limits
is collinearity . A critical assumption of regression
analysis is that the independent variables will not be
correlated with one another. In practice however, a small
degree of correlation between independent variables is
quite common and tolerated to a certain degree. However,
if collinearity becomes too pronounced, it can wreak utter
havoc on the parameters of the model. In a preliminary
incarnation of one of the models presented here (attached
in the appendix), collinearity created several problems.
One problem encountered was wildly divergent findings on
the effects of gubernatorial and constitutional office
contribution limits. Limits in the gubernatorial races
produced a statistically significant and substantive change
in contribution behavior in the hypothesized direction, yet
the limits on constitutional offices produced an equally
substantive and significant effect in the opposite
direction. The problem was clearly collinearity. In
models that were constructed using the binary limit
variables, collinearity was so perfect that Stata removed
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variables in order to estimate the model. Under such
circumstances, collinearity has clearly gone beyond that
tolerable threshold and must be dealt with decisively.
Dealing with collinearity need not be a complicated
matter. The simplest and best approach is to increase the
number of cases. Obviously this is not possible in this
situation. Another possible approach is to simply
eliminate variables. In this case deleting one or two of
the limit variables does eliminate perfect collinearity,
but as the first example above has shown, it did not
eliminate the profound and deviant effects it had on the
model. Reducing the limit variables to a single variable,
would certainly solve the problem, but it would lose
explanatory power in those several states with varying
degrees of limits across office type. The best, and most
accepted technique in dealing with this problem given the
dataset, is to create an index using factor analysis.
Factor analysis is a most efficient technique for data
reduction taking several variables that measure different
aspects of a single phenomenon, and creating a single score
composed of those original variables. This newly created
index replaces all the previous variables in the model
measuring contribution limits, thus eliminating the problem
of collinearity (see appendix for results). Yet most
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importantly, it preserves the most important components of
the several variables used to measure the restrictiveness
of campaign contribution limits. The index created has a
range of 0 to 100, from states with the most restrictive
systems (0) to no restrictions (100).
Accounting for Public Finance Systems
The accounting for the two categories of public
finance regimes was very straight-forward and simple. Two
binary variables were created. One indicates states that
have direct party aid; the other, those states that
directly aid candidates. Proper care was taken to ensure
that states were classified in each year to include only
those years that public financing was actually in place.
Many states adopted public finance systems during the span
of the times series. For example: Maine from 1984 to 1996
was a "party only" state, but the initiative of 1996
changed its status in 2000.
Control Variables
Because of the vast amount of work done on the
determinants of political participation, any effort to
model must take into account all the factors that have been
found as critical in explaining peoples' participation.
These accounts must be made in one of several ways. They
could be placed directly into the model, accounted for in
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another variable or set of variables not previously
explored, or they could be excluded based on sound
theoretical and testable grounds. With a solid footing in
the broad literature on political participation the models
of contribution are cautiously developed. Each of the
elements discussed in the previous sections have been
accounted for in the control variables.
The socioeconomic status of the respondents are
accounted for in education and income levels. Both of
these variables are ordinal measures in the NES data set.
Income is measured in quintiles and coded 1-5. The
advantages of using quintiles over the absolute income in a
time series analysis are obvious over sixteen years of,
albeit modest, inflation. Additionally, quintiles are a
fine indicator of relative socioeconomic status rather than
absolute wealth. Leighley and Nagler (1992) argue that in
addition to several issues of measurement error and
stability of relying upon the occupational dimensions of
SES, most governmental programs that would have a
substantive impact on a respondent are explicitly based on
distinctions that the government makes between individuals
based upon their income (p 727). Education levels are
coded 1-4 reflecting the highest level of attainment (grade
school, high school, some college, college degree).
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Virtually all previous work shows a positive relationship
between higher SES and participation; contribution behavior
should be no exception.
Demographic variables are accounted for as well. Race
is included as a binary variable on self identification as
a racial minority. Though the early works mentioned
previously by Olsen and Orem did show higher levels of
participation amongst black voters when income and
education levels have been controlled for, the extension of
this behavior might not extend readily to checkbook
participation for the reasons explained earlier. Given the
overwhelming dominance of whites in the donor pool and the
relatively small numbers of non-whites in the sample, any
attempt to account for variation between different races
cannot be inferred. Unfortunately, the limits of the
dataset compel us to use a simple dichotomous variable of
self-identification as a minority. The positive
relationship between age and the various mode of
participation is quite secure, and therefore is a key
control variable in the models. Gender discrimination has
been shown to be a key stumbling block in the "pathways" to
participation. The same results should be expected in
checkbook participation. Appropriately, gender is a key
control variable. Marriage is also accounted for in a
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simple binary variable (1= married, widowed, separated;
0=single, divorced, cohabitating ) . Though Stoker and
Jennings (1995) did find that short-term disruptions in
marital status (newlyweds, newly divorced, etc.)
temporarily suppressed political participation, the long-
term relationship between marriage and participation is
positive. Unfortunately that dynamic element cannot be
accounted for in the NES dataset, but marriage should net
out to be a positive determinant of contributing.
The ambient political environment that the respondent
is in also needs to be controlled for. A concurrent
gubernatorial or Senatorial election may lead to increased
voter awareness or greater solicitation efforts by
candidates, parties, and interest groups prompting higher
rates of contributions. A simple binary variable controls
for both circumstances. Higher political competition at
the state level also may spur greater general
participation. With a greater need for campaign funds in
these tight conditions, citizens may face increased
pressures (both internal and external) to contribute. A
modified version of Holbrook and Van Dunk's (1993) was
employed to yield a competition index of 0-100 in each
state during each of the years in the model (a complete
description and result report may be found in the
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appendix). Solicitation, a key indicator of contribution
likelihood as shown by Grant and Rudolph (2002), is
included as a binary variable as well. The level of
professionalization in the respondents' state legislature
is measured using Squire's (2000) index. Respondents
living in more professionalized states may be subject to
more constant pressure to contribute from state party
organizations. If this is true, more solicitations will
lead to higher levels of contribution.
Political interest, as measured by the NES, is
reflected in an ordinal scale ranging from 1-3. Knowledge
is accounted for in a simple additive index based on
questions regarding partisan control of the House and
Senate. Both interest and knowledge have been strongly
associated with higher rates of participation and this
relationship should hold for contributing in particular.
Partisan identification is measured on a four-point scale
ranging from independent to strong partisan. Those who
strongly identify with a party should be much more willing
to make a contribution to either a candidate or a party,
than those who are more independent. The efficacy index is
the NES measure of external efficacy. Clearly those who
feel more secure, and place value in their role in the
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political system will be more willing to make a financial
contribution
.
Other measures of political connectedness should be
controlled for, and would have substantive interest in
their own right, as well. Household union membership (a
simple binary variable), may increase the political
connectedness of that household given the enormous
mobilization efforts that unions make with their
membership. Yet, the effects on the likelihood of a
political contribution may in fact be negative, as members
know that a portion of their dues is funneled into some
form of electioneering. This may lead to the conclusion in
the mind of a member that he or she has, "Done my part,"
and that their personal contribution would be excessive.
Church attendance may also be positively associated with
increased contribution rates, since peoples' "civic
competence," that Strate et al (1989) discuss, are
developed in this social context. As such, an ordinal
measure of church going frequency is included.
The Dependent Variables
In regards to the dependent variable(s), several
questions were asked in the NES regarding an individual's
contribution behavior and whether a party made contact with
the respondent. Fortunately the distinction between
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candidate contributions and party contributions were made.
This allows us to determine if state contribution limits
and public finance systems have a different effect on the
two different kinds of contributions. Unfortunately, there
is no exact information on the recipient of the
contribution. No distinction is made between what party
organization, be it local, state, or national, is the
beneficiary/' So too for the recipient of an individual
candidate contribution. However, since we can hold
national laws constant across the sample, they should not
have a differential impact. But state laws should, so any
differences could be attributed to state laws. Since the
underlying theory that stricter campaign contribution
limits and public financing of candidates compels parties
and candidates to increase solicitation efforts (and
thereby individual contribution rates would increase in
those states), it is necessary to model both the likelihood
of solicitation and contribution.
Results
Often times respondents don't even know. I have got this
sense both in interviews I've had with contributors (albeit
anecdotal) and by looking at Grant and Rudolph's APS 2000
data. Generally an answer to that query would yield a
simple "The Republicans," with no knowledge of what party
organization they had given to.
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To test the effects of campaign finance laws on party
behavior, a logit model was constructed to predict the
probability that an individual would be solicited by a
major political party. Previous research, mentioned
earlier by Grant and Rudolph, has show that party
solicitation is one of the best determinants of the
likelihood of a contribution being made. In the pooled NES
data, nearly 26 percent of the respondents were contacted
by one of the major parties. This model is the first step
in testing whether or not the hypothesized indirect
relationship between laws and contribution behavior exists.
If it does, we should see a change in party behavior as a
result of different campaign finance regimes. The results
of the party solicitation model are presented in table 4.1.
The dependent variable is whether or not a major party
contacted the respondent. Each of the independent
variables discussed in the previous section are included.
They are grouped thematically for ease of interpretation.
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Table 4.1: Party Solicitation Model
Coefficient
Standard
Error
Z P>|z|
Campaign Finance Regime
Limit Index 0.0007 0 .0008 0.85 0.394
Public Candidate Funding 0.0508 0 .0771 0.66 0.510
Public Party Funding -0.1696 0.0662 -2.56 .010**
SES
Education 0.1856 0.0355 5.23 0 .000***
Income 0 . 1326 0.0300 4.42 0 . 000***
Demographics
Age 0.0166 0.0018 9.07 0 .000***
Male -0 .0849 0.0567 -1.5 0.135
Whites 0.1267 0.0725 1.75 0.080
Marriage 0.1809 0.0681 2.65 0.008**
Political Engagement
Partisan Strength 0.0734 0.0294 2.5 0.012*
Efficacy 0.0023 0.0007 3.19 0.001***
Knowledge 0.1709 0.0377 4.53 0.000***
Political Interest 0.2868 0.0427 6.71 0.000***
Church Attendance 0.0736 0.0180 4.09 0.000***
Union House -0.1749 0.0689 -2.54 0.011*
Political Environment
Competition Index 0.0276 0.0041 6.72 0.000***
Gubernatorial Race -0.0113 0.0841 -0.13 0.893
Senate Race 0.1046 0.0593 1.77 0.77
Legislature Professionalization -0.1069 0.1816 -0.59 0.556
Year Control Variables
1988 0.0134 0.8872 0.15 0.880
1992 -0.5112 0.0887 -5.76 0.000***
1996 -0.0919 0.0973 -0.87 0.345
2000 0.2444 0.1448 1.69 0.091
Constant -5.7309 0.3523 16.27 0.000
number of cases 7831
Psuedo r-square 0.0812
note: Dependent variable Party Solicitation
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, two-tailed.
Virtually all the variables that have been vital
indicators of higher participation levels in the literature
across the various modes of participation show both high
levels of significance and have a substantial impact on the
likelihood of an individual getting a solicitation call
from a party. Education, income, age, marital status,
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partisan strength, efficacy, knowledge, political interest,
and church attendance were all positively correlated with
the likelihood of a solicitation. Too, all of these
results were in the hypothesized directions. Though not
significant in a two-tailed test, the probability that
self-identif ied whites heard the call of the party as
compared to non-whites, was significant in a one-tail test
in the hypothesized direction. As for the controls of the
ambient political environment, the level of political
competition in the respondent's state was a highly
significant indicator of a solicitation call. A concurrent
senatorial race also increased the likelihood of a
solicitation call. An interesting finding was that of
union households. Union members were less likely to
receive a solicitation (.25) than were non-union households
(.29), when all other variables are held to their mean
values. Perhaps the parties' rational prospecting
considers union members a hard sell since many see their
dues as a form of contribution. These however, are merely
the control variables, the variables of real concern to
this study are those that measure the effects of the
campaign finance regime.
Despite the multiple incarnations of the variable sets
to measure the restrictiveness of spending limits, the best
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measure, the limit index, was about as flat as
statistically possible. The results were practically the
same in models that used the ordinal and binary limit
measures, but the model using the index was free of
multicollinearity . This suggests that this particular
aspect of campaign finance reform has little impact on
solicitation behavior of the political parties. To
paraphrase Malbin and Gais, there are limits to the
effectiveness of limits in altering parties solicitation
behavior; and by extension, the eventual contribution
behavior of individuals. However, the impact of the other
dimension of campaign finance regimes modeled here, public
financing is quite dramatic. Those respondents living in
states with public financing systems that directly aid
parties were less likely to receive a solicitation. To put
substantive numbers to the cryptic coefficient, an
individual living in a state with no public financing
system to the parties had a probability of .24 of being
called, as opposed to .21 for an individual in a state that
does provide public funds for political parties. Not only
is this a substantive difference, it is of very high
statistical significance.
To show the impact of public financing in spatial
terms, consider figure 4.5. The lines in this graph
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represent the change in the probability of being solicited
by a party in states that have public support of parties
(bottom line) and those that do not (top line). It also
shows the dramatic effect that political competition in the
respondent's state has on likelihood of solicitation too.
All other variables in the model are held to their means.
The space between the lines shows the effect of the public
financing for state parties. Both lines rise (probability
increases) as the level of competition rises from a low of
around 40 in the sample to a high near 80. This gives a
visual representation of how these two independent
variables interrelate with one another and what their
effects are on the dependent variable.
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Figure 4.5: Predicted Probability of Solicitation Under
Public Party Financing by Political Competition
Public Financing No Public Financing
Figure 4.6 is a similar predicted probability graph
charting income and public party financing. Here too the
differences between the states with and without funding are
clear. Those who live in states without public party
subsidies are more likely to be solicited. The positive
relationship between income and solicitation is also clear.
As respondents move up to higher income quintiles, the
likelihood of being solicited increases markedly.
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Figure 4.6: Predicted Probability of Solicitation Under
Public Party Financing by Income
Public Financing No Public Financing
Now that there is some substantial support for the
hypothesis that campaign finance laws do shape the
behaviors of parties, attention should be paid to the
behaviors of individual citizens. Just because reforms
seem to change the behavior of parties, the assumption
cannot be made that individual contribution behavior will
change simply because the behaviors of the solicitors have
been shaped by the law. Table 4.2 shows the results of t'r
modeling of respondent's likelihood of making a
contribution to a political candidate. Here again most of
the "usual suspects" of the determinants of general
political participation were found to be significant and
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substantial in the likelihood of an individual making a
candidate contribution. Education, income, age, partisan
strength, efficacy, knowledge, and political interest all
were important factors. Solicitation was highly
significant in predicting whether or not a candidate
contribution was made. An unsolicited respondent had a
probability of making a contribution to a candidate of
.020, while a solicited respondent's contribution
probability was .044 (all other variables held to their
means )
.
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Table 4.2: Candidate Contribution Model
Coefficient
Standard
Error Z
P>|z|
Campaign Finance Regime
Limit Index 0.0001 0.0015 -0.07 0.942
Public Candidate Funding 0.2987 0.1462 2.04 0.041*
Public Party Funding 0.1677 0.1257 1.33 0.182
SES
Education 0.4292 0.0702 6.11 0.000***
Income 0.4444 0.0630 7.06 0.000***
Demographic
Age 0.0269 0.0037 7.31 0.000***
Male 0.1425 0.1095 1.30 0.193
Whites 0.2678 0.1670 1.60 0.109
Marriage -0.2201 0.1349 -1.63 0.103
Political Engagement
Partisan strength 0.1303 0.0582 2.24 0.25*
Efficacy 0.0042 0.0014 2.88 0.004**
Knowledge 0.2479 0.0853 2 . 91 0.004**
Political Interest 0.7804 0.0955 8.18 0.000***
Church Attendance -0.0464 0.0347 -1.34 0.180
Union House 0.0309 0.1357 0.23 0.820
Political Environment
Competition Index 0.0081 0.0084 0.97 0.335
Gubernatorial Race 0.0620 0.1765 0.35 0.726
Senate Race -0.1480 0.1154 -1.28 0.200
Legislature Professionalization 0.2796 0.3402 0.82 0.411
Party Solicitation 0.8192 0.1082 7.57 0.000***
Year Control Variables
1988 0.2857 0.1792 1.59 0.111
1992 0.0307 0.1770 0.17 0.862
1996 -0.0435 0.1994 -0.22 0.827
2000 0.0868 0.2915 0.30 0.766
Constant
number of cases
Psuedo r-square
-10.8218
7816
0.1878
0.7558 -14.32 0.000***
note: Dependent variable Candidate Contribution
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, two-tailed.
Special note should be taken on two other control
variables as well, and they may deserve further exploration
in their own right elsewhere: race and marriage. Contrary
to the early findings of race and voting participation,
self-identif ied minorities were less likely to contribute
as hypothesized earlier. The significance level of .109 is
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close to the accepted threshold of .10 in a one-tailed
test. As hypothesized earlier, it would appear that
"excess participation" of self-identified minorities that
Gutterbock and London discuss in respect to voting, does
not apply to checkbook participation. Married individuals
were less likely (.023) to contribute to candidates than
the unmarried (.029). Perhaps this is an artifact of less
disposable income. These questions however, go beyond the
scope of this study and should be followed up separately.
The campaign finance regime that a respondent lived
under did play an important role in the likelihood of an
individual making a candidate contribution, though it does
offer a mixed picture depending upon the specific policies
one lives under. Contrary to the expectations of the
underlying hypothesis presented earlier, contribution
limits placed on individuals by the states had absolutely
no effect on the likelihood of an individual making a
candidate contribution. The coefficient of the limit index
was nearly zero. The fact that contribution limits have
little impact on individual's contribution behavior makes
intuitive sense. From the parties' and candidates'
perspectives, would they really be less driven to raise
money in states with high limits as opposed to states with
low limits when they know full well that the average
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contribution is far below the limit in every state?
Probably not! From the perspective of the average citizen
would a difference between a $1,000 limit, $10,000 limit,
or no limit constrict behavior when most contributions are
far below all of those figures? No disincentive exists for
an individual living in a state with a limit that is high
above what they would give in the first place. Only in
states with extremely low limits like Vermont would any
behavioral changes be expected. Unfortunately, the NES
sample does not contain enough respondents from Vermont or
any of the other tightly regulated states to make solid
statistical inferences upon.
Where campaign finance regimes do have an effect upon
individual behavior is in those states that have public
finance systems in place. States with public financing
systems that directly benefit candidates have statistically
significant, and higher, rates of citizens making
contributions to political candidates. This should come as
no surprise, since Malbin and Gais have shown that these
states have a common goal in their reform efforts to raise
the number of small contributions from a broader base of
citizens. To get a better intuitive grasp of this models
findings, the use of an "ideal type" case can be useful.
For a well educated, middle class, middle aged citizen of
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moderate partisanship, living in a state with a public
finance system aiding candidates, the probability of
contributing would be .050. For a citizen of the same
qualities living in a state without the public finance
system the probability would be .037; a difference of about
one quarter. Predicted probability graphs also aid in
interpretation of these coefficients.
Figure 4.7 shows the probability of contributing to a
candidate in states with public subsidies to candidates
with the income quintile of the respondent. The gap
between the two lines represents the difference between
states that aid candidates (top) and states that do not
(bottom) . Naturally the probability of contributing rises
with the changing value of the income quintile that the
respondent is in.
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Figure 4.7: Predicted Probability of Candidate Contribution
Under Public Candidate Financing Regimes by Income
Public Financing No Public Financing
Figure 4.8 shows exactly the same dynamic. In this
graph the predicted probability is graphed against the
respondent's partisan strength to emphasize the important
relationship between partisanship and the likelihood of
contributing. If predicted probability graphs were created
for any of the significant dependent variables (so long as
they are continuous and not binary), the results would be
the same.
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Figure 4.8: Predicted Probability of Candidate Contribution
Under Public Candidate Financing Regimes by Partisan
Strength
Public Financing No Public Financing
The party contribution model had virtually the same
results as the candidate contribution model. The results
are presented in table 3. Nearly all of the control
variables had the same effects as they did in the previous
model. Only three merit further mention. Race seems to be
unimportant in the likelihood of a party contribution.
This suggests that in this particular form of checkbook
participation (giving to your party), there is no
appreciable difference between whites and non-whites. For
some reason though, this does appear to be a male-dominated
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activity. Males had an overall probability of contributing
of .026 as opposed to females at .019. The _esult in the
party model suggests that there still a distinct gender gap
in checkbook participation. Marital status in the party
contribution model was a significant indicator of lower
contribution rates. Those unmarried respondents had a
probability of contributing of .028, whereas married
respondents had a probability of .020. Again issues of
disposable income may explain this difference. However,
further investigation of this should be done elsewhere.
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Table 4.3: Party Contribution Model
Coefficient
Standard
Error
Z V N
Campaign Finance Regime
Limit Index 0.0010 0.0015 0.64 0.523
Public Candidate Funding 0.3742 0.1489 2.51 0.012*
Public Party Funding 0.2751 0.1254 2.19 0.028*
SES
Education 0.3887 0.0706 5.50 0.000***
Income 0.4763 0.0640 7.45 0.000***
Demographics
Age 0.0311 0.0037 8.30 0 . 000 ***
Male 0.3131 0.1120 2.81 0.005**
Whites 0.1277 0 .1635 0.79 0.435
Marriage -0.3630 0.1360 -2.67 0.008**
Political Engagement
Partisan Strength 0.3347 0.0623 5.37 0.000***
Efficacy 0.0049 0.0015 3.32 0.001***
Knowledge 0.2034 0.0867 2.35 0.019*
Political Interest 0.8620 0.0983 8.77 0.000***
'9 Church Attendance -0.0080 0.0352 -0.23 0.819
Union House 0.0973 0.1399 0.70 0.487
Political Environment
Competition Index 0.0124 0 .0084 1.47 0.142
Gubernatorial Race -0.0566 0.1824 -0.31 0.756
.T Senate Race -0.1312 0.1159 -1.13 0.258
Legislature Professionalization -0.4171 0.3487 -1.20 0.232
Party Solicitation 0.6443 0 .1098 5.87 0.000***
Year Control Variables
1988 0.3244 0.1738 1.87 0.062
- 1992 -0.4849 0.1851 -2.62 0.009**
1996 0.0696 0.1922 0.36 0.717
2000 0.0039 0.2991 0.01 0.990
Constant -11.9314 0.7736 -15.42 0.000
number of cases 7825
Psuedo r-square 0.2017
note: Dependent variable Party Contribution
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, two
tailed.
The results for the campaign finance system variable
set are much the same in the previous model of candidate
contributions. The limit index is equally flaccid in the
party contribution model. Again, contribution limits are
generally far beyond what most citizens are willing or able
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to contribute so most will feel no constriction in their
behaviors, but more importantly there is no evidence of an
indirect effect either. Public financing systems, of both
flavors, are strongly associated with higher rates of
contribution to political parties. Respondents living in
states with public financing of candidates had a
probability of making a party contribution of .027 as
opposed to .021 of those respondents whose states do not
subsidize parties. Respondents living in states with
programs supporting parties had a .029 probability of
contributing to a party as opposed to .020 for the others.
Respondents who live in those few -States that support both
parties and candidates had a .036 probability of -
contributing over a probability of .019 of all the other
states
.
To further illustrate the results of the party
contribution model again refer to the predicted probability
graphs presented in figures 4.9 and 4.10. Figure 4.9 shows
the increase in the predicted probabilities in states of
public subsidy to candidates over those without such
subsidies. Figure 4.10 shows the same dynamic in regards
to party subsidies. Figure 4.11 shows that special dynamic
in those few states with public support for both parties
and candidates. The greater contribution rates of states
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with more "comprehensive" public finance systems are
highlighted by the greater distance between the lines than
seen in the previous probability graphs. Also take note
that the gap at the lower end of the income quintiles is
noticeably narrower. This is due to much lower rates of
contribution in lower income respondents, regardless of the
state financing system. As you move up from the lower
income quintiles to the higher end, the effects of the
si idies become more pronounced, since these are the
in. v ruals that comprise the great bulk of contributors.
Fig re 4.9: Predicted Probability of Party Contribution
Und-. r Public Candidate Financing Regimes by Income
Public Financing No Public Financing
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Figure 4.10: Predicted Probability of Party Contribution
Under Public Party Financing Regimes by Income
Public Financing No Public Financing
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Figure 4.11: Predicted Probability of Party Contribution
Under Comprehensive Public Financing Regimes by Income
Comprehensive Financing No Financing
All of these models presented to this point are static
in nature. That is, they do not account for changes within
the campaign finance laws. Because all the states in each
of the years are modeled simultaneously, the effects of
change will not be captured. Though they do present a fine
explanation of certain types of campaign finance regimes,
we have no way of determining if changes in the law are
accompanied with a change in contribution behavior. To
this end a set of binary variables was employed to show a
change in the state's contribution limits since the last
election cycle. Two binary variables were created for
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either an increase or decrease in contribution limits,
using states with no change as a reference variable. Table
4.4 shows the result of the dynamic model on candidate
contribution behavior. It is quite apparent that even when
this account for change in the law is added, limits have
their limits in changing people's contribution behavior by
either a direct or indirect route.
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Table 4.4: Individual Contributions Model with Change in
Limits 1988-2000
Coefficient
Standard
Error
Z P>|z|
Campaign Finance Regime
Increased Limits 0.0073 0.1252 0.59 0.553
Decreased Limits -0.0074 0.0092 -0 .80 0.442
Public Candidate Funding 0.3069 0.1349 2.28 0.023**
Public Party Funding 0.1604 0.1283 1.25 0.211
SES
Education 0.4284 0.0702 6.10 0.000***
Income 0.4445 0.0630 7.06 0.000***
Demographics
Age 0.0271 0.0037 7.34 0.000***
Male 0.1433 0.1095 1.30 0.194
Whites 0.2715 0.1672 1.62 .104
Marriage -0.2231 0.1350 -1.65 .098
Political Engagement
Partisan Strength 0.1312 0.0582 2.25 . 024*
Efficacy 0.0042 0.0014 2.89 .004**
Knowledge 0.2483 0.0853 2.91 . 0 0 4 * *
Political Interest 0.7779 0.0955 8 .14 0.000***
Church Attendance -0.0464 0.0347 -1.34 0.180
Union House 0.0244 0.1360 0.18 0.857
Political Environment
Competition Index 0.0082 0.0084 0.98 0.329
Gubernatorial Race 0.0613 0.1767 0.35 0.728
Senate Race -0.1502 0.1161 -1.29 0.196
Legislature Professionalization 0.2916 0.3378 0.86 0.388
Party Solicitation 0 .8189 0.1082 7.57 0.000***
Year Control Variables
1988 0.3895 0.2967 1.31 0.189
1992 0.0369 0.2687 0.14 0.891
1996 -0.0385 0.2834 -0 . 14 0.892
2000 0.0811 0.3542 0.23 0.819
Constant
number of cases
Psuedo r-square
-10.8287
7816
0.1879
0.7546 -14 . 34 0.000
note: Dependent variable Candidate Contribution
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, two-
tailed .
Conclusions
The preceding analysis lends a fair amount of support
to the hypothesis that campaign finance laws do in fact
shape contribution behavior of individuals by an indirect
means, but not necessarily according to the restrictiveness
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of campaign finance laws as initially hypothesized.
Instead, public financing, regardless of whether it is
directed at candidates, parties, or both, appears to have
the biggest impact on the likelihood of an individual
making a political contribution.
The party contribution model presents the strongest
case for the effect of public subsidies. Individuals in
states with some form of party subsidy were less likely to
be subjected to party solicitation calls as initially
predicted. However, the likelihood of an individual
actually making a contribution in those states was higher,
as shown in the party contribution model. At first blush,
this could be interpreted as a breakdown of the indirect
effects thesis at the heart of this inquiry. But I would
argue that the indirect effects are still present, just in
a different dynamic than initially predicted.
States that have direct party aid are strengthening a
critical linkage institution by infusing them with money.
They will then take advantage of those additional resources
and what they do best: contact voters and in doing so,
raise more money. The distinction being that they are more
efficient in their fundraising efforts. Instead of making
broader based appeals by casting the net out farther, which
would seem to be the case in states that are entirely
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funded privately, they are more focused on taking advantage
of better established and known political networks that can
yield more money from fewer sources. This would suggest
that vigorous and healthy party organizations, as critical
linkage institutions, find more productive ways of
prompting political participation other than intrusive
solicitation calls. Simply put, states that support these
important linkage institutions with direct public subsidies
are creating a culture of political giving.
The impact that the direct public financing of
candidates had on contribution in the models was also in
clear support of the indirect causal hypothesis presented.
In every single case where a state has created a system of
public financing directly to candidates, lower limits on
the size of contributions have been simultaneously enacted.
The logit models allowed us to separate the effects on
contribution behavior that of each of these two aspects of
campaign finance regimes have. In states that have lower
limits, but no public financing, limits alone clearly do
not create an incentive structure, however direct or
indirect, that prompts individuals to contribute more often
to political parties or candidates. Nowhere, in any of the
models, was there even a suggestion that limits, in and of
themselves, increased contribution rates. The dynamic
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model also soundly rejected the notion that a downward or
upward change in limitations had any effect on changing
peoples' contribution behaviors. Clearly, the initial
hypotheses regarding contribution limits were overstated.
But, as the logit regressions parsed out, direct candidate
subsidies created clear incentives for candidates to
solicit more numerous, small contributions from individuals
to qualify for funding. Again, just as in the case of
party subsidies, states that create these incentives,
foster a culture of political giving.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS,
POLICY IMPLICATIONS,
AND
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Conclusions
The early research on voting participation provided a
solid foundation to explore the nuances and determinants of
political contributing. The modeling done by Reiter
(1979), followed by Burnham (1982 and 1987), Cavanaugh
(1981), Te_xeira (1987 and 1989), Wolfinger and Rosenstone
(1980), showed that a firm basis in socioeconomic status is
the necessary starting point into any query of
participation. Over the years, a clear need to thicken the
general participation models beyond SES had emerged.
Scholars happily met that need. Works such as Strate et al
(1989) and Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) deepened our
understanding of political participation by focusing on
factors such as social networks and mobilization of
political parties. While deepening our understanding of
the determinants of voting participation, they
simultaneously called on scholars to branch out and explore
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additional explanations of political participation and
apply those models to other modes as well in the spirit of
Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995). This work has also
answered that call.
To date, a select few have modeled contribution
behavior. Shields and Goidel (2000) and Grant and Rudolph
(2002) made the contribution decision the center of their
work. The shared traits are that they have all based their
work firmly on the work of these aforementioned scholars
and adapted those models to the contribution decision.
Additionally, they have provided another piece of the
puzzle in explaining the determinants of checkbook
participation. No one, however, had done a state level
analysis using individual data to gauge the effects of the
most common campaign finance regimes on the likelihood of
making a contribution. Though there was a clear lack of
support for some of the initial hypotheses (effects of
contribution limits), some solid support for the hypotheses
of indirect effects on individual behavior did emerge.
Should a state wish to create conditions that are more
conducive to political giving, it now seems clear that
there are some viable and effective ways to do just that.
Properly constructed campaign finance laws can have a clear
impact on the likelihood of an individual making a
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political contribution to a party or a candidate. As
initially hypothesized, the mechanism by which this works
is indirect. Campaign finance laws that directly subsidize
political candidates place incentives upon candidates to
broaden their financial base as much possible to qualify
for the public subsidy. Consequently, in states that had
such programs, the likelihood of an individual making a
political contribution was significantly higher.
States can also foster a culture of political giving
by directly funding political parties. This too has the
indirect mechanism as seen in candidate subsidies. There
has been broad consensus amongst political scientists and
historians on the value of political parties as linkage
institutions that play critical roles in representation,
interest articulation and aggregation, and mobilization.
Rosenstone and Hanson (1993), along with a raft of others,
have strongly argued that the decline of the political
parties in the electorate has in large part been
responsible for the overall decline across the modes of
political participation over the last century. This
analysis strongly suggests that parties do have an
important mobilization role in this regard, and that
individuals' participation in the mode of campaign
contributing can be increased with the infusion of public
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money to strengthen those organizations. As Rosenstone and
Hansen noted, individuals seldom contribute without
prompting. Political parties, strengthened by public
support, stimulate that critically important mode of
participation: checkbook participation.
This analysis also has shown that there are distinct
limits to effectiveness of contribution limits in prompting
greater rates of political contributing. There was
absolutely no evidence that contribution limits, in and of
themselves, had any direct or indirect effect upon
individual contribution behaviors in the states. In order
for contribution limits to have an effect, they would have
to be below even the lowest limits any state has today to
effectively restrain peoples' contribution behavior. Too,
contributors that would be restrained by one type of
restriction on political giving would simply "max out" on
one mode, and move on to another mode with higher (or
nonexistent) limits. In the data sets used for the
modeling in Chapter 4, these contributions would still be
captured because the variable is dichotomous; thus in that
regard the model lacks proper sensitivity. Perhaps
interval or ordinal level data (actual dollar amounts of
individual contributions), should it become available,
would better gauge the effects of contribution limits.
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This analysis, however, should not be used as evidence
that contribution limits are wholly ineffective as a
political reform. This study was narrowly focused on the
likelihood of contributions alone; none of the other
purported benefits that reformers claim come with
contribution limits were being tested. Obviously
contribution limits have effectively reached one of their
goals: the reduction of the role of the large contributor.
Also, there is new evidence that tighter limits may lead to
mo. competitive elections (Stratmann and Aparicio 2006).
However, if higher contribution rates are the stated goal
of ore restrictive individual contribution limits,
rei rmers should concentrate on creating incentives by
otr r means.
Policy Implications
The conclusions to be drawn from this analysis can be
very instructive in the terms of the current debate in
campaign finance reform that the nation has been engaged in
for over a decade. The state level analysis has shown that
certain facets of reform have worked quite well in
prompting more individuals to engage in checkbook
participation. Yet others, appear to have failed. Again,
low individual contribution limits, in and of themselves,
seem to have no direct or indirect effect in changing
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individual contribution behavior. Despite these obvious
failures, reformers should be pleased that public financing
programs have produced the desired effects in broadening
the financial basis of political campaigning.
Reformers should be heartened that public financing,
regardless of who the primary recipient is (parties or
candidates), does in fact have a substantive and
statistically significant effect on bringing more people
into the pool of political contributors. Even though this
pool is still a small percentage of Americans, this
represents no small victory for reformers. Candicate
centered programs, where states directly support ualifying
candidates with money, showed the most profound r suits in
the candidate and party contribution models of Che pter 4.
These states create clear incentives for candidates to
raise large numbers of small contributions in order to
qualify for matching funds. Some states mentioned in
Chapter 3, such as Minnesota, create incentives directed at
the contributors themselves, by offering $50 tax rebates on
contributions made to candidates. Obviously programs such
as these will create a broader base of contributors than
would be the case in states with no public finance regimes.
This analysis also supports the hypothesis that
political parties' behavior can be influenced through
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deliberately structured campaign finance regimes. Though
the party models all soundly discounted the effectiveness
of contribution limits alone in shaping behavior, party
behavior was affected by direct public financing. The
solicitation model clearly showed that parties in states
with direct subsidies to their organizations spent less
time in their solicitation activities. Yet, those
respondents in states with public party subsidies, were
more likely to contribute, despite not being solicited as
often as respondents in states without public party
financing. This suggests that vigorous and healthy party
organizations, as critical linkage institutions, find more
productive ways of prompting political participation other
than intrusive solicitations. Additionally, in those few
states that had direct aid to both candidates and parties
(see figure 4.11), the probabilities of contributions by
respondents in this sample were nearly twice those of the
states with no public financing. These results speak to
the effectiveness of carefully constructed reforms that
build linkages between citizens and their political
institutions, be they reforms that help parties or
candidates
.
Despite the good news that this analysis delivers to
reformers, they must also take heed. The reforms that seem
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to generate the best results are also those reforms that
are often the most politically unpopular, amongst policy
makers and citizens alike. Framing of the debate, as
explained by Grant and Rudolph (2004), is the key to
success or failure of these reforms being passed. Except
in those few instances where reformers have been able to
frame the debate as "clean elections" laws being passed by
popular initiative, public support for government
subsidized campaign finance systems have been flagging in
recent years. The "softness" and ambivalence of the
American people on this issue spells real trouble for
reformers in maintaining, much less expanding, public
finance programs. By many measures, the popularity of
these programs is trending sharply downward. Perhaps the
measure of greatest consequence is the checkoff rate on tax
returns filed.
Both at the federal and state level, fewer and fewer
citizens are making the checkoffs for public funding on
their tax returns, even when there is no additional cost in
their tax bill. Though there is speculation that many
taxpayers do not fully understand that there is no
additional tax encumbrance and that tax software might be
partly to blame for the downturn (see Campaign Finance
Institute's 2003 task force report), there is still a
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marked difference between the checkoff rates in the 1970 's
and 1980's and today. Figure 5.1 shows the precipitous
drop in participation at the federal level from levels of
over twenty five percent in the early years to less than
ten percent today. Even in the immediate years following
the creation of the state systems, some foresaw the
inherent weaknesses, and anticipated feeble participation
rates (Noragon 1981). Malbin and Gias (1998) have shown
this to be the case, and have documented the rapid decline
of citizens choosing to checkoff public finance programs on
their state tax returns.
Figure 5.1: Federal Checkoff Rates 1977-2004
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Because of this sharp drop, both the federal and state
governments have had to consistently raise the dollar
figure set aside from each checked-off tax return. At its
inception, the federal checkoff was a dollar for an
individual return. It was tripled as part of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 to head off a projected
shortfall for the 1996 election cycle. The states have
also followed suit. Figure 5.2 shows the average checkoff
amount from 1986-2002. Clearly state programs are falling
short financially as well and having to adjust for the drop
in participation rates.
Figure 5.2: State Checkoff Average Amounts 1986-2002
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Despite these attempts to stop the hemorrhaging of the
lifeblood of these finance programs, the federal
government, and the states in particular, seem to be
holding back this tide of nonparticipation with a broom.
If the apparent benefits of broader political participation
derived from public financing of political parties and
candidates are to be sustained, reformers will have to
devise a strategy to reinvigorate the public's support. If
support cannot be rallied, and the current trends in public
opinion remain unchanged, it will only be a matter of a few
short years that these programs will be so under-funded
that their effects on contribution behavior will be nil.
Suggestions for Further Research
Like any query of this kind, several new questions
have also been made apparent in the course of research that
cannot be pursued for innumerable reasons, be they
methodological or in the interest of keeping focus on the
research question at hand.
Perhaps the most important questions to be pursued in
other forums are the other determinants that the modeling
has shown to be significant that go beyond the SES of
respondents and had nothing to do with campaign finance
laws. The persistent gender gap in contribution merits
further review. Despite the fact that the gender gap in
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voting has been erased and indeed reversed, and significant
ground has been made up in the inequities of income and
other SES factors, women are still less likely to engage in
checkbook participation than their male counter parts.
This is especially true of the large scale contributors.
An effort should be made to tease out the factors that
persist, particularly social factors that Verba, Schlozman,
and Brady explore, that may account for this gap in
contributions. Perhaps this is an artifact of the
reporting, i.e. a female respondent from a high income
household not making a contribution while her husband had.
Or there could be a genuine difference in activities, where
women tend to choose other modes of participation or are
giving their discretionary income to other groups.
Questions of racial inequities also need to be
addressed. Even when the SES attributes of racial
minorities are controlled for, checkbook participation
still seems to be a white dominated mode of participation.
This, despite the fact that racial minorities are becoming
more and more politically engaged in other modes of
participation and in fact are more likely to participate in
some modes than are whites. For some reason, people who
identify as racial minorities seem to discount the value of
making a financial contribution in favor of other modes of
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political participation. Closer attention should also be
paid to, if data were to allow (as it clearly did not in
the NES data used here), differences between the
contribution patterns of the different minority groups to
see what the participation trends are over the past several
election cycles.
Another important area of campaign finance reform that
deserves serious attention is the change in federal laws
that came with the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
( BCRA ) . This analysis necessarily left any consideration
of the BCRA out for two important reasons. Firstly,
federal laws needed to be held constant, so the 2004
election cycle was omitted. Secondly, and equally
important, there has been but one election cycle under the
BCRA. Any inferences between pre and post BCRA election
cycles would be far too weak statistically to be of much
value in the kind of modeling done in Chapter 4, since
short term factors could not be sorted out from the deeper
effects of the change in policy. Only after a few more
election cycles could this modeling be done beyond the
highly speculative educated guesses that can be presently
made. In the spirit of wildly speculative guesses though,
the changes in the BCRA in regards to the banning of soft
money for party fundraising and higher limits for
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individual candidate contributions may net little effect.
Though there was a distinct rise in the contribution rate
of NES respondents from 9.2 to 12.4 percent between 2000
and 2004, short term political factors such as the close
competition between Bush and Kerry may be the cause rather
than the changes in the finance regime.
Another area that will be worthy of deeper study a few
election cycles down the road are the effects of clean
election laws on the likelihood of individuals making
political contributions. Here too, there were far too few
cases to make any inferences upon in this study since only
the states of Maine and Arizona had clean election laws on
the books for the tail end of the time series. If one were
to speculate on the effects of these laws, one would have
to guess that should enough candidates participate in these
programs, we should expect to see a drop off in
contribution rates. That is the whole aim of these laws:
to remove individual contributions from the financing in
all stages of the campaign, except for the seed money being
raised for qualification in the very early stages of the
primary campaigns.
Though more nuanced understandings of the determinants
of support for public financing has been pursued, best
exemplified by Grant and Rudolph's 2004 work, the rapid
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decline in participation in tax checkoffs seems to be at
the very least inconsistent with public opinion. Great
pains have been taken here to show the softness and
malleability of popular support for any kind of public
financing, but the ten percent checkoff rate in the federal
program is simply too low given what the public opinion
polls tell in their worst showings. Curiously, and perhaps
not unrelated, as the participation rate fell, there have
been increases in the rates of electronic filing, use of
tax preparation services, and home tax software for tax
preparation (Weissman 2005). Though the aforementioned
Campaign Finance Institute's task force report (2003)
raised important questions and prompted software
manufacturers to make some changes, a deeper analysis is
certainly warranted.
Regardless of which of these questions we as
researchers undertake, the study of campaign finance is a
study laden with many landmines. This is because the lines
between empirical research, normative values of democratic
governance, and partisan political advocacy are too often
blurry or even non-existent. This study has tried to
acknowledge and avoid these pitfalls, and dispassionately
examine the measurable effects of campaign finance reform
in regards to the one normative cause that most everyone
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can agree upon: increasing the rate of participation in
political system.
our
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APPENDIX A
PRELIMINARY MODEL
A preliminary model using ordinal measures of
individual contribution limits in the 2000 NES release.
Note the substantive and statistically significant
coefficients in the opposite directions. The two scales
her near perfect collinearity
,
though not enough for the
cc ater to reject the model. There is little doubt that
the jcilinearity was driving the confounding results.
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Table A1 : Preliminary Model Using NES 2000 Data
Solicitation
Electoral Competition
Male
White
Education
Interest in Election
Marital Status
Age
Income
Union House
Partisan Strength
Ef f icacy
Knowledge
Concurrent Gubernatorial
Election
Concurrent Senatorial Election
Public Finance System
Limit in Gubernatorial Race
Limit in Constitutional Race
Constant
Log Likelihood -235.946
Number of Cases 1251
Coef
.
Std
.
Error Z P> | z |
0.85447 0.26757 3 .19 .001***
0.04997 0.02039 2.45 .014*
0.28241 0.26121 1.08 0.28
0.28672 0 . 38638 0.74 0.458
0.12324 0 .17710 0.70 0.487
0.82816 0.22337 3.71 .000***
-0.75260 0 .30493 -2 47 .014*
0.03407 0.00953 3 7 .000***
0.63814 0 . 14545 4 9 . 000***
-0.33019 0 . 37902 -0 57 0.384
0.041729 0 . 13181 0 2 0.752
0.00191 0 .00325 0.59 0.557
0.17563 0 .17478 1.00 0.315
-0.27056 0.39089 -0.69 0.489
0.19405 0.31751 0.61 0.541
-0.36334 0 .37673 -0.96 0.335
-0.68147 0.26989 -2.53 .012*
0.56872 0.25876 2.20 .028*
-12.2462 1.66351 -7.36 0.000
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*p< . 05
,
**p<.01, ***p<.001, two-tailed.
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APPENDIX B
FACTOR ANALYSIS OUTPUT
The following tables present the Stata output on the
factor analysis and scoring conducted to create the index
of individual contribution limits restrictiveness. indgov,
indconst, indsenate, and indhouse are the ordinal
categories based on dollar amount of each limit in each
state
.
Table A2 : Factor Analysis Output
Factor
(principle
Eigenvalue
factors; 2
Dif ferenc
factors retained)
e Proportion Cumulative
1 3.68605 3.50255 0.9616 0.9616
2 0.18350 0.18845 0.0479 1.0095
3 -0.00495 0.02653 -0.0013 1.0082
4 -0.03148 # -0.0082 1.0000
Variable
Factor Loadings
1 2 Uniqueness
indgov 0.92886 0.25014 0 .07466
indconst 0 . 96229 0 .18189 0 .04092
indsenate 0.97716 -0.19614 0.00669
indhouse 0.97079 -0.22221 0.00819
Variable
Scoring Coefficients
1
indgov 0.17318
indconst 0.26432
indsenate 0.49658
indhouse 0.18440
166
APPENDIX C
THE LIMITS INDEX
The following table reports the limits index for each
state throughout the time series. 0 represents the most
restrictive states, 100 represents the most unrestricted
states
.
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Table A3: The Limits Index
State 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000
AL 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
AK 10.00 10.00 0.00 10.00 0.00
AZ 100.00 0.00 4 . 44 4.44 0.00
AR 20.00 20.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
CA 100.00 100.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
CO 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
CT 12.43 12.43 12.43 12.43 23.54
DE 4.44 4.44 14.44 14.44 14.44
FL 27.78 27.78 0.00 0.00 0.00
GA 100.00 100.00 60.00 17.78 23.33
HI 30.00 30.00 30.00 35.43 35.43
ID 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 45.56
IL 100.00 100.00 100.00 100 . 00 100.00
IN 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
IA 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
KS 27.78 27.78 17 . 16 17 . 16 17 . 16
KY 50.00 70.00 70.00 0.00 10.00
LA 100.00 100.00 62.22 62.22 62.22
ME 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 0.00
MD 10.00 10.00 70.00 70.00 70.00
MA 0.00 0.00 10.00 0.00 0.00
MI 13.33 13.33 13.33 13.33 13.33
MN 45.60 45.60 51.15 1.77 1.77
MS 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
MO 100.00 100.00 100.00 4.44 100.00
MT 1.77 1.77 1.77 0.00 0.00
NB 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
NV 100.00 100.00 45.56 24 .15 24 . 15
NH 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00
NJ 84 . 08 84.08 85.85 21.77 31.77
NM 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
NY 100.00 100.00 100 . 00 91.36 93.09
NC 70.00 70.00 70.00 70.00 70.00
ND 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
OH 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 40.00
OK 40 . 00 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00
OR 100.00 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00
PA 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
RI 100.00 100.00 10.00 0.00 0.00
SC 100.00 100.00 27.78 32.22 32.22
SD 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
TN 100.00 100.00 100.00 40.00 40.00
TX 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
UT 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
VT 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 0.00
VA 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
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WA 100.00 100.00 100.00 4.44 14 .44
WV 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
WI 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 43.83
WY 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
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APPENDIX D
STATE COMPETITION INDEX
The competition index used here is a modification of
Holbrook and Van Dunk's (1993) competition index. The
calculation using district level data is quite simple. 100-
( (average percent vote for winners + average margin of
victory + percent uncontested seats )/3). This yields a
possible range of 0 to 100 with 0 representing no
competition and 100 representing "perfect" competition.
P
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Table A4 : State Competition Index
1984 1988 1992 1996 2000
AL 52 59.8 72.7 74.7 49.2
AK 73.2 73.4 78.9 73.3 62.4
AZ 59.7 67 .
1
74.8 73.3 65 .
1
AR 51.8 58.3 64 76.3 67.9
CA 63.5 62 .
6
70 69.4 65.9
CO 67.5 68.4 73.3 74.4 63
CT 75.4 68.7 74.8 74 70.1
DE 75.3 69.9 73.8 70.6 73.3
FL 45.6 47.8 67.3 60.9 48.2
GA 50.4 58.5 70.2 71.6 66.5
HI 60.5 66.2 70.3 73.6 67.6
ID 72.4 72 73.3 75.8 65.9
IL 67 64.3 68.7 64.9 62
IN 73 .
1
71.7 72.4 73.4 72.3
IA 75.2 72.3 66.3 76.9 73.7
KS 66.3 58.9 73.4 70.5 63.3
KY 63.4 56.4 75 69.5 73.7
LA 36.5 45.2 56.5 51.7 52 .
ME 67.2 68.6 73.6 76 .
1
71.3
MD 64.2 60.9 68 .
4
69 . 65.9
MA 56.4 45 69 .
5
64.2 41.9
MI 63.9 63.3 70.3 69 .
3
68.2
MN 72.3 70 75.8 74.7 75.6
MS 57 69.3 64.4 71.1 67.2
MO 67.2 70.3 73.7 72.6 72.5
MT 70.4 78 . 79.3 74 . 79.7
NE 68.6 73.4 75.5 69.4 70.6
NV 73.2 73.6 78 . 79.3 78 .
NH 69.6 72.5 77 .
1
80.7 78 .
NJ 70.3 60.2 72.4 70 .
9
69.4
NM 70.5 62 .
1
72 77.7 74.7
NY 64.2 51.5 63.8 64.6 61.3
NC 76.4 65.4 74 . 73.4 64.6
ND 66.7 73.8 74.9 75.2 73.8
OH 60.6 59.5 70.6 67.5 65.3
OK 66 .
8
56.5 70.2 73.6 64.6
OR 74 . 64.3 72.6 76.6 71.4
PA 65 53.2 60 .
3
71 62.4
RI 71.2 72.8 70 . 70.2 71.2
SC 62 .
9
72 67 61.8 67.7
SD 68.5 72.7 74 . 76.9 70.5
TN 47.6 53.9 65.9 71.9 52.8
TX 49.9 42.6 60.3 69.9 53
UT 67 .
7
70.6 75.2 70.9 70
VT 77.7 75.5 70 . 73.6 68.5
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VA 54 .
9
54.5
WA 69.8 65.1
WV 74.1 61.9
WI 64.7 64 .
8
WY 64.5 73 .
67 63
.
5
60 .
3
76.3 75.7 71.6
59.7 49 54
74 73.2 70 .
1
76 76.3 68.1
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